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RECENT PATTERNS OF TESTATE SUCCESSION 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 
Olin L. Browder, Jr.* 
T HE massive and pervasive aggregate of processes by which wealth is transmitted from generation to generation remains 
in large part, like an iceberg, below the surface of our common 
knowledge. Our assumptions about this phenomenon have been 
based either upon generalizations from the experience of practition-
ers or upon the reports of appellate cases. These sources have tended 
to limit our knowledge disproportionately to instances involving 
relatively large accumulations of wealth. One would expect that 
more representative data would reveal that many of our assumptions 
about the transmission of wealth are sound. Proper investigation 
may also reveal a margin of error in current assumptions of fact or 
emphasis. Still, an enormous range of questions of fundamental, if 
not ultimate, significance lies beyond any pretensions of the common 
lore. For instance, the social and economic significance or conse-
quences of current law and practice in this field remains largely 
virgin territory. 
Those interested in looking below the surface to discover how 
testators actually behave and the reasons for their behavior have 
been confronted with the enormity of the investigative problems 
involved. For example, the problem of measuring the dimensions 
of the transmission of wealth otherwise than by testate or intestate 
succession has so far proven beyond anyone's reach. Recent investi-
gation has been modestly designed to illuminate some corners of 
the whole structure.1 The purpose of the investigation which re-
sulted in this Article involved no greater pretensions. Considerable 
public and professional interest has recently been aroused about 
our cumbersome processes of administering decedents' and trust 
estates.2 Although this survey is not irrelevant to those problems, the 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1935, LL.B. 1937, University of 
Ilinois; S.J .D. 1941, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
l. See, e.g., Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission 
at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 241 (1963); Friedman, Patterns of Testation in the 19th 
Century: A Study of Essex County (New Jersey) Wills, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 34 (1964); 
Powell &: Looker, Decedents' Estates, 30 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 919 (1930); Ward &: Beuscher, 
The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 WIS. L. R.Ev. 393. 
2. The current work of the Special Committee on the Uniform Probate Code of 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is the most 
significant development in this connection. Popular interest has been aroused by 
N. DACEY, How To Avow PROBATE (1965). 
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basic emphasis here is upon discovering what testators really seem 
to want to do with their property and how they in fact do it. Some 
limited social and economic significance may be perceived in the 
results of such an inquiry. But the main emphasis is upon the utility 
of our great proliferation of dispositive devices to meet the current 
needs of those who wish to dispose of property by will and upon the 
skill and effectiveness with which such devices are used. The latter 
inquiry may enable us to evaluate the professional performance of 
those upon whom testators typically rely to formulate and effectuate 
their various objectives. 
The data used herein were derived from two sources: the records 
of decedent estate administration in Washtenaw County, Michigan, 
and similar records in London, England. In Washtenaw County, the 
probate court records of all testate estates for the year 1963 were 
examined.3 These totaled 223 estates, thirty-six of which were ex-
cluded for most of the present purposes because, for want of assets, 
no administration followed the initial filings. The title of this Ar-
ticle carries no pretension that these records constitute a reliable 
basis for conclusions about current practices generally in the United 
States. The complexion of the population of Washtenaw County 
does suggest that in some respects it can be regarded as average, 
despite the presence within it of two universities. The population 
estimate at the time of this survey was 187,000; two cities, Ann Arbor 
and Ypsilanti, accounted for over half of this total. Depending on 
the standards used, twenty to twenty-six per cent of the population 
can be designated as rural. The western part of the country is dis-
tinctively rural; the eastern part, which abuts Wayne County where 
Detroit is situated, is to some degree industrial. 
This study purports to be in part a comparison of American and 
English testamentary practices. The virtual absence in England of 
estate records as we know them imposed limitations on the attain-
ment of this objective. For present purposes, data concerning English 
practices were derived almost entirely from one hundred English 
wills selected at random from those filed during the year 1963 in the 
Principal Probate Registry in London. To the extent that these wills 
came from all over England and Wales, they can be regarded as 
representative of English practices generally. But the much smaller 
size of the sample in relation to the population which it represents 
should be taken into account. 
3. Some time lag seemed necessary to allow for the completion of administration. 
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I. SUCCESSION BY WILL IN AMERICA: A MICHIGAN SAMPLE 
A. Testamentary Dispositions to Spouses, Issue, and Others 
The primary purpose of this portion of the Article is to reveal 
the identity of the beneficiaries of the testate estates covered by the 
Washtenaw County sample. Table 1 shows the identity, by cate-
gories, of family members or other relatives who survived both 
testate and intestate decedents.4 This data lays a foundation for 
ascertaining the extent to which testators responded in their wills 
to the normal ties of blood or marriage. Currently there is consider-
able interest in the question whether the traditional intestacy 
statutes require modification to reflect existing attitudes and prac-
tices in the transmission of family wealth. The data presented in 
this section is relevant to that question. 
I. Disposition to Surviving Issue When No Spouse Survives 
In those cases in which a spouse did not survive the testator, the 
sample revealed not a single instance in which the testator totally 
disinherited his surviving issue. In only three wills out of a total of 
sixty-seven did the testator exclude any surviving child or children.5 
Only eighteen wills included gifts of anything more than specific 
personal chattels to anyone other than spouses or issue. And no more 
than three of these created substantial interests outside the immedi-
ate family. For the rest, small bequests appeared as follows: nine 
wills included charitable bequests, one will included brothers and 
sisters, four wills included spouses of children, and four wills in-
cluded bequests to nonrelatives. It is the almost universal pattern 
among intestate succession statutes that a decedent's issue will take 
his entire estate when no spouse survives. If intestate patterns are 
designed to reflect normal donative objectives-and if representative 
4. For convenience the categories in the table reflect the determination of heirs 
which in Michigan is normally made in the course of administration of both testate 
and intestate estates. Account should be taken of the fact that the intestate sample 
excludes 64 estates which were administered by summary procedures, and 9 in which 
there were no determinations of heirship. Summary procedures could be followed with 
estates valued at less than Sl,500, which results, upon proof of payment of debts and 
expenses, in distribution to the surviving spouse or, if none, to next of kin. MICH. 
COMP. L. ANN. §§ 708.39-.41 (1968). In most of the cases in this sample, distribution 
was to surviving spouses. 
5. Two of these involved estates valued at less than $10,000. The third estate, 
valued at nearly $127,000, was left in trust for the testator's three daughters and 
their issue, but excluded a son for the stated reason that he was otherwise well pro-
vided for. 
TABLE 1 
Distribution of Estates by Classes of Survivors and Sex of Decedents 
Testate 
Male Female Total % Testate Total 
Spouse and Issue 41 (48%) 13 (13%) 54 (29%) 54% 46 (29%) 
Issue 23 (26%) 44 (44%) 67 (36%) 56% 53 (33%) 
Collaterals 8 (9%) 39 (39%) 47 (25%) 57% 36 (23%) 
Spouse and Collaterals 9 (10%) 2 11 8 
Spouse 2 - 2 2 
Spouse and 
Father or Mother 
- - -
1 
Father or Mother 
-
1 1 10 
No heirs 4 1 5 3 
Totals 87 (100%) 100 (100%) 187 (100%) 159 (100%) 
Intestate 
Male Female 
40 (38%) 6 (11%) 
22 (21%) 31 (57%) 
24 (23%) 12 (22%) 
5 3 
2 
-
- 1 
9 1 
3 
105 (100%) 54 (100%) 
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will patterns accurately indicate such objectives-there is little basis 
in the present data for challenging the traditional intestate norm. 
Ours is one of the few legal systems in the world which does not 
impose some degree of restraint upon the power of a testator to 
disinherit his lineal descendants. Nevertheless, there has been vir-
tually no sentiment in this country for changing the law in this 
respect. The reason usually advanced is that restraints upon disin-
heritance are unnecessary-that testators rarely disinherit their chil-
dren in any event. 6 Even if they do, it is usually for the same reasons 
which would defeat forced heirship in civil-law jurisdictions: the 
unworthiness or misconduct of the beneficiary. The data studied in 
this sample supports this argument. But this need not preclude us 
from considering other alternatives. Under the English Family 
Provision legislation, for instance, minors or children who for stated 
reasons are incapable of maintaining themselves may apply to the 
High Court for relief when the parent's will or the law of intestacy 
does not make "reasonable provision" for them. 7 Of course, the 
adoption of such an alternative in the United States might prove to 
be objectionable because its administration would be vested in a 
multitude of local probate courts instead of in a single High Court 
of Justice. 
2. Disposition When Both Spouse and Issue Survive 
In those cases in which both the testator's spouse and issue 
survived, the most striking fact revealed by the sample was that 
twenty-six out of fifty-four testators8 left everything to their spouses.9 
Each of the twenty-six wills contained substitutional gifts of all or a 
substantial portion of the estate to issue in the event the spouse 
predeceased the testator.10 Six testators designed their wills to gain 
the marital deduction for federal estate tax purposes by giving 
benefits to their spouses to the extent of substantially one half of the 
value of their respective estates. Except for the wills which gave all 
of the estate to the spouses, only three wills excluded any of the 
6. L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 24 (1955). 
7. Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1 &: 2 Geo. 6, c. 45 (1938), as amended, 
Intestates' Estates Act, 15 &: 16 Geo. 6 &: 1 Eliz. 2, c. 64, pt. II (1952). 
8. Female decedents accounted for only four of these cases. 
9. At least one other study made similar findings, see Dunham, supra note 1, 
at 252. 
10. It may be worth noting that eighteen of these estates were valued at less than 
$25,000, and only three at more than $100,000. Seven wills gave life interest in all or 
substantially all of the respective estates to the testator's spouse, with remainders to 
issue. One of these gave the spouse a general power of appointment; another gave 
a trustee the power to invade corpus for the benefit of the testator's wife. 
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testator's surviving children.11 The cases in this category thus reflect 
little interest among testators in providing benefits outside the 
nuclear family. Only six wills out of a total of fifty-four bequeathed 
anything to anyone other than spouses or issue.12 
The cases in this and the preceding section reflect the triumph 
of the so-called nuclear family in testamentary succession. Few wills 
affront the legal or moral claims of the primary objects of the dece-
dent's bounty. This fact is most emphatically established in the treat-
ment of issue. The protection of spouses is a more subtle matter, 
not only when there are competing claims of issue, but also in the 
absence of issue. There is evidence here that a majority of testators 
will in some manner establish a priority of spouses over issue. This 
finding contrasts sharply with the pattern most commonly pre-
scribed by intestacy statutes. These statutes typically limit a spouse's 
share to one third or one half of the estate when issue survive, de-
pending upon whether one or more than one child survives. The 
empirical evidence would seem to suggest some reason for altering 
this course of descent to give the entire estate to a dependent spouse 
when its size does not exceed a minimum which is regarded as ade-
quate to provide for his or her needs. If the fact of dependency is 
regarded as too difficult for a probate court to determine (particu-
larly in the case of a surviving husband), the same result could be 
justified simply on the ground that it is consistent with the normal 
desire of decedents. The interests of minor dependent children 
would usually be served as effectively by such a devolution as by 
some division of property under which their interests would be 
received by the spouse in the formal capacity of guardian. Of course, 
the place of a surviving spouse in family property succession looms 
larger still when no issue survive. 
3. Disposition When the Spouse but No Issue Survives 
In cases in which the spouse but no issue survived the testator 
nine of thirteen wills in the sample left everything to the spouses, 
and another reduced a widow's residue by only a small legacy to a 
sister. However, in two of the three remaining wills the testator 
11. One of these excluded a son because of the large extent of his own resources; 
one excluded a daughter because inter vivos gifts had been made to her; and one 
excluded a son in favor of a brother in an estate that proved to be insolvent. 
12. Three of these included bequests to brothers or sisters in relatively small 
amounts; one was a devise to a brother, which he redeemed from an insolvent estate 
by paying all debts and expenses; two included relatively small bequests to charities; 
and two made small bequests to non-relatives. 
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limited the spouse's share to one third of the total estate; these two 
wills suggest an intent on the part of the testator to provide only 
what the law requires. In fact, one of these wills left all of the bal-
ance of an estate valued at over 200,000 dollars to charitable pur-
poses. So long as a testator is free by his will to change or disregard 
the statutory pattern of succession within the limit of his widow's 
right of election, it can be argued that there is no compelling reason 
for not awarding an intestate estate in its entirety to a surviving 
spouse when no issue survives. The existence of one or more surviv-
ing ancestors may be the only appealing occasion for an exception 
to this general rule.13 
4. Spouse's Portion and the Widow's Right of Election 
The data examined above reflects the firm, if not predominant, 
place of spouses in the dispositive scheme of a large majority of 
testators. But the empirical evidence does not show very much about 
the other side of the coin: the extent of any sentiment by testators 
to evade or minimize the moral or legal claims of their spouses. In 
large estates employing the marital deduction, tax considerations 
may operate as a special factor to limit the portions left to spouses. 
Moreover, several of the cases mentioned above suggest the presence 
of a desire to limit spouses to amounts equivalent to their elective 
shares under the intestacy statute. Such cases also suggest one of the 
most elusive of all questions on this matter: How important is a 
widow's forced share or right of election in securing to her an ade-
quate portion of her husband's estate?14 
Fraud upon or evasion of the forced share of widows by inter 
vivos transactions is not reflected in probate records. Even so, the 
probate records examined in this survey revealed no case in which 
a widow claimed access to any property not inventoried in the 
13. Under the Michigan statute, it should be noted that except for the first $3,000 
provided for a surviving widow, a spouse is entitled to one-half of the estate if any 
parent, brother, sister, or the issue of a brother or sister survives. l\11cH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. §§ 702.80, 702.93 (1968). Only if none of these survives and no issue survives 
does a spouse take the entire estate. 
14. In states which prescribe a forced share for widows, the share is usually that 
portion of real or personal property, or both, to which she would have been entitled 
if her husband had died intestate. Such a share is often subject to further limitations 
which restrict it to one third or one half of her husband's estate. In Michigan, a 
widow, if she elects to take against her husband's will, may elect to take dower and 
homestead rights, or (1) her intestate portion of her husband's real estate, which 
cannot exceed one half thereof, and (2) the first $5,000 and one half of the balance 
of her intestate portion of her husband's personal property. l\IICH. COMP. L. ANN. 
§ 702.69 (1968). 
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estate. In only one case did a widow elect to take against her hus-
·band's will.15 In that case, involving an estate valued at 186,157 
dollars, the testator gave his wife only a life interest in the family 
residence and blithely explained this by the statement that she was 
amply provided for by life insurance. He devised a farm to a son 
and the residue to his six children. Although it may have been naive 
for the testator to have relied upon his wife's consent to this arrange-
ment when he made his will, he did have a point which suggests an 
imperfection in the law of election. Perhaps this law should be 
amended to take account of assets other than those included in his 
will which pass to a widow upon her husband's death.16 
In two cases widows who were given less than the statutory share 
elected to abide by the terms of the wills.17 The testators in three 
more cases gave their widows life estates in real estate comprising 
all or the bulk of the probate estates, which were valued at 11,000 
dollars or less. Three other wills limited widows to their statutory 
shares.18 
In Michigan, wives, but not husbands, have the right of election 
against a will.19 This suggests that the force of the law of election 
can be tested by data concerning the provisions which female dece-
dents make for their husbands. The trouble with using such data to 
infer the behavior of male testators in the absence of the law of elec-
tion is that it does not take account of the relative economic status of 
husbands and wives. The value of the following data may be further 
limited by the fact that out of one hundred cases in which the dece-
dents were female, only fifteen of them were survived by husbands. 
Within this sample of fifteen cases, six wills left everything to the 
decedent's husband, and in two other wills the husband was amply 
provided for. But seven wills either excluded surviving husbands 
altogether or left them amounts less than their intestate portions. 
This fact does not really prove anything, but it may cause one to 
15. In another case a widow tried to elect against her husband's will, but she was 
held barred by the terms of an antenuptial agreement. In fact, in two cases, widows 
were limited to minimal testamentary benefits by the terms of antenuptial agree• 
ments, and in one case the widow was so limited by a separation agreement. 
16. N.Y. DECED. Esr. LAw 18-a (McKinney Supp. 1966) provides for the augmenta-
tion of the assets of a decedent's estate for election purposes by including property, not 
covered by the will, which was the subject matter of certain prior transactions. 
17. The estate in one of these cases was valued at $27,000, the other was valued 
at less than $10,000. 
18. One of these estates was barely solvent; another was valued at $417,830, and 
the third was valued at $223,972. In a fourth case in which the will limited the 
widow's portion, she failed to survive the testator. 
19. MICH. COMP, LAWS ANN. § 702.69 (1968). 
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hesitate before he concludes that there is no longer any real need 
for forced heirshi p for widows. 
For what it is worth, this data, together with that presented in the 
other sections above, is at least consistent with the assumption that 
a large majority of testators will amply provide for their widows 
even in the absence of a forced-share statute. But some evidence 
remains for the proposition that a small proportion of testators 
would, if possible, leave their widows less than the portion pre-
scribed by law. In some of these cases there may be perfectly valid 
reasons for doing so. Unless some flexible type of family provision 
law were accepted,20 an elective forced-heirship statute may be justi-
fied only as a protection against infrequent aberrational behavior. 
But, of course, many of the duties imposed by criminal or tort law 
have no other justification. The proper size of an inflexibly pre-
scribed portion, however, is another matter. If the intestate portion 
allotted to spouses were increased, as suggested above, it does not 
follow that the forced heirship proportion should be correspond-
ingly increased. It may be desirable to give a widow all of her intes-
tate husband's estate when no issue or ancestors survive; it does not 
follow that her husband should be forced to leave everything to her 
in such circumstances. An elective share confined to the traditional 
one third of a decedent's estate still has wide support. But there is 
nothing magical about that percentage, nor does it have to be in-
variable. One half of the estate could also be justified, at least when 
neither issue nor ancestors survive.21 
5. Disposition When Neither the Spouse nor Issue Survives 
As might have been expected, when neither spouse nor issue 
survived, testators dispersed their estates among a great variety of 
beneficiaries. Under these circumstances, the claims of blood or 
marriage are understandably much diluted by considerations of par-
ticular personal associations. The limited data presented here may 
be useful in order to compare the patterns of succession revealed by 
these cases with the hierarchy of heirship declared in the statutes on 
intestate succession. It should be noted first that in all but ten of 
fifty-three cases in which no spouse or issue survived, the testator's 
20. See note 7 supra. 
21. See the elaborate provisions for detennining the elective share in N.Y. DECED. 
EsT. I.Aw § 18 (McKinney Supp. 1966). These provisions have the effect of giving 
greater flexibility to a decedent in framing his dispositions so as to avoid renunciation 
by his widow; he can make certain provisions for his wife, including a life interest in 
certain circumstances, against which the wife may not elect. 
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heirs were brothers and sisters or their issue. In five cases the testa, 
tors left no heirs at all. The wills may be classified as follows: 
thirteen wills made dispositions limited to persons designated as 
heirs; twelve excluded all heirs except for nominal bequests; 
twenty distril:mted property among one or more heirs and one or 
more others; twenty-two made gifts to nonrelatives or persons whose 
identity was not indicated; and eleven included charitable bequests. 
When neither spouse nor issue survives, there appears to be too 
little regularity in the patterns of testamentary succession to justify 
their use as a frame of reference for intestate succession. Consan-
guinity may be the only viable basis for determining such succession; 
indeed, this is the pattern reflected by almost all intestacy statutes. 
But the usual progression of these statutes through remote degrees 
of kinship should be brought within reasonable limits. The pursuit 
of blood lines to remote and unknown relatives, or "laughing heirs," 
can become ridiculous. The only rationale for this progression to 
remote kindred appears to be that anything is better than escheat. 
But if the state can through its taxing power reach substantial por-
tions of the substance of a man who has dependents, it might also 
claim the estate of a decedent who has not chosen to identify by his 
will anyone who has a claim upon his bounty. A schedule of intes-
tate succession which included ancestors as a preferred class and 
stopped with brothers and sisters or their issue would be adequate 
in most cases. A decedent who was unhappy with such a schedule 
would presumably be induced to make a judgment by will which 
would probably be more thoughtful and sensible than a mechanical 
pursuit of his remote kindred. 
6. A Further Note on Intestate Succession 
It has been assumed that the adequacy of intestacy statutes can 
be tested by considering how testators in fact dispose of their estates: 
To what extent do they depart by will from the patterns of intestate 
succession?22 The data appearing in the preceding paragraphs shows 
that most wills do depart to some degree from those patterns. Only 
when a decedent is survived by issue but no spouse does his testa-
mentary pattern tend to approximate the pattern set by law. When 
a testamentary pattern which diverges from the usual patterns of 
intestate succession appears with some frequency, a basis exists for 
suggesting amendments to the intestacy statutes. I have mentioned 
22. See Dunham, supra note 1, 
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some such suggestions above, particularly in relation to the treat-
ment of spouses. 
But the desires of normal or average decedents do not provide 
the sole basis for framing or justifying an intestacy law. Policy 
considerations are also relevant, particularly with respect to re-
straints upon testation such as the forced heirship of spouses. Nor 
can the adequacy of intestate statutes to meet the average donative 
objectives of decedents be tested merely by referring to what testa-
tors in fact do by will. Some attention must also be given to the 
actual extent of intestate succession. The reader should refer again 
to Table I for the purpose of comparing corresponding data on tes-
tate and intestate succession. It will be noted that the three largest 
categories of survivors on both the testate and intestate sides of the 
table are "Issue," "Spouse and Issue," and "Collaterals," in that 
order. The middle column shows that the percentage of testate 
estates in each category varies only slightly among the three catego-
ries. This data would tend to disprove any hypothesis that kinship 
relationships between a decedent and his survivors is a factor af-
fecting the incidence of wills.23 It also reveals the significant but 
unspectacular fact that in all three of the stated categories, slightly 
less than one half of all decedents leaving estates of sufficient size to 
be administered by other than summary procedures were content 
to let the intestate law take its course.24 Among people who are still 
largely free to frame their own particular dispositive schemes by 
will, a willingness by almost half of any group of decedents to allow 
their property to pass by intestacy does not suggest serious disaf-
fection with the intestacy laws. The basic features of the traditional 
statutes still seem to be relevant to average needs. Taking all of 
these factors into account, including appropriate but arguable value 
judgments on matters of social policy, one can project useful re-
finements but not revolutionary changes in the law of intestate 
succession. 
23. In assessing the inducement to make a will on the basis of facts existing at 
the death of the testator, account should be taken of relevant changes after the will 
is made, such as the death of beneficiaries. Although such data usually does not 
appear in probate records, some account may be taken of the fact that in seventeen 
estates listed as showing only issue surviving, the testator made dispositions to a 
spouse who predeceased him. Since there is little difference between the ratio of 
testate and intestate states in the categories "Issue" and "Spouse and Issue," it is 
doubtful that this discrepancy is significant. 
24. Some account should perhaps be taken of those persons who for a variety of 
reasons, including a negligible accumulation of assets, know little and care less about 
where their property goes. But this factor cannot be measured by data appearing in 
probate records. 
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B. Gifts to Charity 
It may be assumed that most persons who receive income make 
annual charitable gifts, if only in nominal amounts. The extent of 
charitable gifts by will, as reflected in the present study, appears in 
striking contrast: only thirty wills out of a total of 187 contained 
such gifts. This number included four wills in which the testator 
made only substitutional charitable gifts in the event primary takers 
predeceased him, and one in which the testator made a charitable 
gift in default of the exercise of a general power of appointment 
by his widow. These facts are shown in more detail-including the 
size of the estates involved-in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
Wills Containing Charitable Gifts by Value of Estate and 
Class of Survivors LL 
Per Cent of Number of Testators 
All Estates Leaving only Collateral 
Value of Estate Number in Category Kin or No Heirs 
Below $10,000 8 13% 6 
$10,000-$24,999 11 22% 8 
$25,000-$99,999 6 13% 4 
Over $100,000 5 19% 1 
Totals 30 19 
It will be observed that two thirds of the wills with charitable 
gifts disposed of estates less than 25,000 dollars. This percentage is 
not significantly inconsistent with the ratio between all estates in 
this value category and the total number of estates in the sample. 
It will be surprising only to those who assume that the incidence of 
charitable gifts would or should rise with the increase in value of 
the estates. 
It can be inferred that the absence of any nuclear family is a 
factor in the incidence of charitable gifts. In this regard, it is not 
surprising to find that in nineteen of the thirty wills reflected in 
table 2 the testators were survived only by collateral kindred or by 
no legal heirs at all. This is in marked contrast with the twenty-six 
per cent of all testators who left only collateral relatives as survivors. 
One can only speculate on other factors to explain what appears to 
be a low percentage of wills containing charitable gifts in all catego-
ries. Most persons probably do not seriously diminish their standard 
of living by means of charitable contributions out of current income. 
More penetrating studies than this would be required to show the 
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extent to which dependents are deprived by the death of the person 
upon whom they principally rely for support. It seems fair to as-
sume, however, that death benefits, including testamentary gifts, 
are rarely the equivalent of the support provided by the decedent 
during his lifetime. An habitual giver of charitable gifts, even when 
moved by tax considerations, is not likely to make charitable be-
quests unless he is sure that his dependents will be adequately pro-
vided for. Still, this does not explain the low percentage of charitable 
bequests in cases of large estates or when no dependent survivors 
were left. Is it possible that standardized procedures for charitable 
fund-raising are simply not geared for generating much pressure for 
this kind of giving? The cost of individual appeals in relation to 
the lack of prospects for an immediate return may limit such ap-
peals to a selection of the more affluent prospective donors. There 
must also be some reticence about approaching an ostensibly healthy 
person in respect to this most private of all property transactions. 
The size of charitable bequests (when this fact was ascertainable) 
in relation to the total value of the respective estates was as follows: 
less than one per cent, four; one through five per cent, eight; six 
through ten per cent, two; and over ten per cent, ten (plus three sub-
stitutional gifts). Eight of the ten testators in the over-ten-per-cent 
category left the bulk of their estates to charity.25 Seven of the testa-
tors either left no heirs or were survived only by collateral kindred.26 
This data may raise some doubt about the need for that type of 
mortmain statute which limits the proportion of an estate which a 
testator can give to charitable beneficiaries in order to protect cer-
tain preferred classes of his surviving relatives. 
C. Gifts of Tangible Personal Property 
Dispositions of tangible personal property sometimes present 
problems which are out of proportion to the value of the property 
25. Most of these estates were small (from $1,969 to $15,875). But one estate was 
valued at $63,513; another was valued at $176,821, most of which was left to the 
building fund of a church; and a third was valued at $223,972, the bulk of which was 
left to the employees' pension fund of a bank. In respect to the last of these, the 
testator limited his surviving widow to her statutory share. 
26. AU gifts were outright except three. One of these was by way of remainder 
in a portion of property left in trust; another was by way of gift in default of the 
exercise of a general power given to the testator's widow. In a third will, the testator 
estabished a charitable trust which directed the trustees to establish and administer 
a scholarship fund for needy students in a designated high school. 
Twenty-two wills made charitable bequests to religious institutions or officials; 
twelve wills made gifts to a variety of nonreligious institutions. Only three wills 
contained gifts of both types. Nineteen of the thirty charitable donors were women. 
1316 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:1!!08 
involved. Children's expectations may be raised by informal, private 
expressions of present or future donative intention respecting family 
heirlooms or other chattels of sentimental value. Unless these expres-
sions are substantiated by will, they can be given effect only if har-
mony prevails throughout the surviving family. Even when nothing 
savoring of a specific promise or completed gift has been made, 
discrepancies between actual and sentimental values and conflicting 
preferences among the survivors can produce family dissension at a 
time when emotions are at the surface and apprehensions are easily 
aroused. If the testator's spouse survives, a practical solution to any 
unresolved question as to the devolution of tangible personal prop-
erty is the common assumption that it all goes, or should go, to the 
spouse. But even here the executor faces the question of what items 
are to be inventoried in the estate. What indeed is the state of the 
title to household goods which have been purchased and used during 
the marriage by both spouses? Lawsuits on such matters are rare, but 
there is some risk in any practical solution which does not have the 
approval of all interested parties. 
An examination of the extent to which these matters have been 
recognized and provided for by the testators in the 223 wills in this 
sample (including the thirty-six wills which were not formally ad-
ministered) indicates that the problem is often avoided by the simple 
expedient of making a residuary gift to one person. This was the 
pattern in sixty-nine wills or thirty per cent of the cases, including 
those in which another single legatee was substituted for a primary 
legatee who predeceased the testator. But a disposition of this type, 
although simple, may be open to objection if it makes all tangible 
personal property part of the pool of assets which is first available 
for the payment of the debts and expenses of the estate. 
Many testators either have not been mindful of any problems 
with respect to the distribution of tangible personal property, or 
they have assumed that their beneficiaries will make a practical and 
amicable division of their goods after death. In forty-eight cases not 
involving other dispositions of tangible goods, testators made resid-
uary bequests-which would have included tangible personal prop-
erty-to more than one person. In three other cases, testators made 
bequests of tangible personal property to more than one person in 
categories that required division. In addition, testators in forty 
cases made gifts including all tangible personal property to primary 
beneficiaries with substitutional gifts to more than one person in 
the event the primary beneficiary predeceased, the testator. This 
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means that in ninety-one wills, or forty-five per cent of the cases, the 
testators either were not aware of, or not concerned about, potential 
problems in the distribution of tangible personal property. 
Potential problems of a different sort were inherent in several 
other wills. In each of two cases, the testator made residuary gifts 
(including any tangible personal property) to his spouse for life, 
with remainders to one or more others. In four joint and mutual 
wills, a similar problem involved gifts of all of the testator's estate 
to the survivor for life, with remainders. The problem here, of 
course, is the definition of the rights and duties of the life tenant 
and the enforcement of the rights of remaindermen when the mvner-
shi p of chattels is divided into present and future estates. Except 
perhaps in the case of specific heirlooms, the creation of legal present -
and future interests in personal property should be avoided. 
When a testator wishes to dispose of all or part of his tangible 
personal property otherwise than by a residuary clause, he must 
exercise some care to avoid ambiguous expressions. It is possible for 
him to identify particular items, but this is rarely done; only ten 
wills in this sample group contained specific bequests of single items. 
Thirty-nine other wills contained gifts of chattels by categories 
expressed with varying degrees of generality and precision.27 No 
word of art exists to designate the totality of such property which is 
normally available for distribution. "Tangible personal property" 
may be appropriate if the testator does not desire a more specific 
categorization. The same term may also be used as a kind of residual 
designation when other more limited categories have been pre-
scribed. 
If a testator is content to leave the disposition of his tangible 
personal property to a post-mortem consensual solution, various 
devices are available to impose some regularity upon that process. 
The need for these devices will turn upon the testator's estimate of 
the family situation. In seventeen wills in this study, the testator 
prescribed procedures for distribution of tangible personal property 
which in varying degrees left room for recognition of the desires and 
preferences of the beneficiaries. In six of these cases, the testator 
gave the executor a power of sale which either expressly or impliedly 
27. Such terms as the following, used singly or in a variety of combinations, have 
been used to describe categories of personal property: tangible personal property, 
personal and household articles, personal effects, household goods, household goods 
and furnishings, household furniture, furnishings and effects, furniture, clothing, 
jewelry, office furniture and equipment, and the contents of a designated place of 
residence. 
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covered tangible personal property. Although an actual forced sale 
would seem to be the least desirable disposition of such property, 
the executor's authority can be used as a means of applying pressure 
to bring the beneficiaries to some consensus among themselves. In 
the other eleven cases the following devices were noted: (1) a be-
quest to a single legatee directing him to divide the tangible per-
sonal property in his discretion as equally as possible among all the 
beneficiaries; (2) a bequest to a single legatee expressing the wish, 
but not the direction, that he distribute the property according to 
an informal memorandum; (3) a bequest to multiple legatees di-
recting them to divide the property among themselves but specifying 
that if they could not agree, the executor should distribute the prop-
erty; (4) a direction to multiple legatees to sign an informal state-
ment of instruction which the testator would leave with the execu-
tor as a grant of authority to distribute property; (5) a grant of au-
thority to a trustee to make distributions of property in his discre-
tion; (6) a direction that if any legatee refused to accept the personal 
property mentioned for him in a letter of instructions to be left with 
the executor, such property should be distributed in the discretion 
of the executor; (7) a bequest to legatees authorizing the executor 
to supervise the selection of property and to sell all items not se-
lected; and (8) a direction that disposition be made according to 
instructions in a letter from the testatrix to her daughter. It should 
be evident that some of these variations could prove to be trouble-
some. An attempt to impose a fiduciary duty upon a person to 
comply with informal directions should be avoided because the 
duty is probably not enforceable. But merely to authorize someone 
to distribute property in his discretion is no less objectionable. It 
is not clear whether this amounts to an absolute bequest, some sort 
of bare power of appointment, or an attempt to impose a fiduciary 
duty. If such a duty is discovered, it may fail for want of definite 
beneficiaries. An outright gift to one person of all tangible personal 
property, fettered only by the moral force of such informal direc-
tions as the testator chooses to provide, is an acceptable solution. 
But if such a legatee has a personal interest in the ultimate distri-
bution of the property, there is some risk of actual or fancied par-
tiality. If a disinterested executor is chosen for this purpose, he need 
not be given the property outright; he may simply be empowered 
to distribute it in his discretion among designated persons, to sell 
all of the property not distributed, and to add the proceeds to the 
residue. 
Some estate lawyers specify more elaborate testamentary direc-
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tions to executors on procedures to be followed in making disposi-
tions of this sort. Under some of these procedures, all chattels in 
the estate would first be appraised. After an order of priority was 
established, the legatees would proceed to· select particular desired 
items on a rotating basis. Each legatee's right of selection would 
end when the aggregate of his selections reached the value of his 
share of the entire pool.28 Here drafting simplicity as well as admin-
istrative convenience and economy are sacrificed in the interest of a 
maximum practicable satisfaction of beneficiaries' desires. 
D. The Testamentary Transmission of Real Estate 
It is commonly assumed that real estate is a minor source of per-
sonal wealth or family endowment. Family dynastic wealth in land, 
it is said, is no longer a significant feature of our economy. The data 
from the Michigan sample, although it verifies the relative predomi-
nance of personal property in testamentary succession, does tend to 
show that decedents continue to transmit real estate in substantial 
amounts by will. Another common assumption is that most family 
real estate-in particular the family home-is jointly owned by 
spouses and thus seldom appears in probate. The Michigan data 
also supports this assumption, but again we must guard against ex-
aggeration. Such studies as have been made on the subject support 
the assumption about the high incidence of jointly owned land,29 
but they do not indicate the ultimate disposition of this land. It 
28. The following sample provision of this type appears in W. LEA.ca, CAsES AND 
TEXT ON THE LAW OF WILLS 258 (1960): 
If my wife ••• survives me, I bequeath to her all tangible personal property 
which I shall own at the time of my death; and I hope, but do not require, that 
out of this property she will give to each of my children, children-in-law and 
grandchildren some token of my affection for them. If my said wife does not 
survive me, I bequeath such tangible personal property in three equal shares as 
follows: 
(a) ••. (b) • • • (c) ••• [with substitutional provisions to prevent any of this 
property from passing into the residue unless all persons designated fail to sur-
vive the testator.] 
In the interest of family harmony I hereby state that I have not promised any 
particular thing to any person. If my wife does not survive me and the tangible 
personalty is, therefore, to be divided among the persons named in Clauses (a), 
(b), and (c), I recommend but do not require that all items of this property be 
appraised by a professional appraiser and that those who are to participate in 
the division then select in rotation items at the appraised values, the order of 
choice to be determined by lot. It seems to me improbable that the legatees 
named in this Paragraph will desire to own any large portion of the tangible 
personal property which I leave. I recommend, but do not require, that whatever 
articles are not desired by any legatee shall be sold by my executor and the pro-
ceeds thereof divided, after charging against each legatee the appraised value of 
items which he has elected to take in kind. 
29. Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancies: Law, Fact and Fancy, 51 IowA L. REv. 
582 (1966). 
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may be assumed that a considerable amount of residential property 
is successively transmitted on the market without ever coming to rest 
in a decedent mvner's estate. But it is also true that when land is 
jointly held by spouses, it is solely owned by the survivor; unless it 
is put back on the market after the death of one of them, it will 
very likely appear in the survivor's estate. In fact, of the ninety-nine 
estates in this survey which included real estate, sixty-eight were 
estates of decedents who left no surviving spouse. Such figures seem 
to support both the stated assumption and the caveat about jointly 
held land. 
The incidence of real estate in decedents' estates, classified by 
value, is indicated in Table 3: 
TABLE 3 
Distribution of Estates by Value and the Incidence of Real Estate 
Number and Estates Containing 
Value of Estate Percentage of All Estates Real Estate 
Below $5,000 34 (18.2%) 8 (8%) 
5,000-9,999 30 (16%) 16 (16%) 
10,000-24,999 49 (26.2%) 24 (24%) 
25,000-49,999 26 (13.9%) 17 (17%) 
50,000-99,999 22 (11.8%) 14 (14%) 
100,000 and over 26 (13.9%) 20 (20%) 
Total 187 (100%) 99 (99%) 
Of the sample of 187 estates studied, ninety-nine, or fifty-three 
per cent of the total number of estates, included real estate. But real 
estate accounted for only twenty-five per cent of the total value of 
all estates. In sixty-two of ninety-nine estates, real estate constituted 
fifty per cent or more of the total value of the estate. These cases, 
of course, were concentrated among the smaller estates, only four-
teen of which were valued at 50,000 dollars or more. In ten estates 
each under 60,000 dollars, real estate was the only property inven-
toried. Of the wills covering the ninety-nine estates which included 
real property, only twenty-seven contained any specific reference 
to real estate. Twenty-three of these wills included specific devises, 
two mentioned real estate as part of residuary bequests, and two 
included directions to sell all real estate. Only six of the specific 
devises created life estates and remainders in land.30 In all other 
30. Eight of the specific devises were of the testator's residence, four were of farms, 
and two were of land used in connection with businesses. Of the four devised farms, 
one was given to the testator's daughter and only child for life, with remainder to 
her daughter; one was devised to one of two children, with the balance of the estate 
to be divided between both children; and one was devised to one child, with the 
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cases the testator transmitted real estate either by language disposing 
of all of his property or by residuary clause. 
This finding would seem to indicate that the ownership of real 
estate by most testators has little special effect upon the formulation 
of their testamentary schemes. Rather, real estate is most often 
thought of merely as one form of transmissible wealth; little regard 
is given to its preservation intact or its distribution in kind. '.This 
indiscriminate treatment of real and personal property, however, 
produces special problems in the administration of decedents' 
estates, when the physical characteristics of land cannot be so easily 
ignored. Interests in land are the least liquid of a decedent's assets 
and the least susceptible of flexible administration. Unless there 
are sufficient liquid assets to pay debts and expenses of administra-
tion, the executor may be forced to convert real estate into liquid 
assets pursuant to a power to sell or to a court order. But in those 
instances in which a testator wishes to make a specific devise of land, 
this may severely distort his scheme of distribution. Thus, care 
should be taken to provide sufficient other assets to preclude the 
sale of land to pay debts and expenses. 
In contrast to the prevalent English testamentary practice of 
placing all of one's estate within the framework of the ingenious 
trust for sale, the Michigan sample shows only limited use of powers 
in executors to sell land. The records in twenty-four estates in this 
survey reflected proceedings leading to orders by the probate court 
to sell real estate to pay debts, expenses of administration, or lega-
cies. In one other estate, the court ordered the executor to mortgage 
the real estate to pay debts and expenses. In only three cases was 
real estate sold without court order pursuant to a power in the 
executor to sell in his discretion. In three of the estates in which 
court orders of sale were obtained, the executors had been given 
authority by will to sell without such an order. Although none of 
the proceedings which resulted in court orders was contested, the 
practice or necessity of resorting to judicial procedures caused un-
necessary delay and expense.31 
residue to six children. A fourth will gave one son an option to purchase a farm 
within ninety days after inventory, after which the farm was to pass as part of the 
residue to the testator's four children. 
One of the two wills which devised real estate in connection with business in-
terests gave the property to four of the testator•s five sons on condition that they pay 
the testator's wife 400 dollars a month for her life. The other involved a half in-
terest in a partnership which the testator shared with his son, and which he left 
to his three daughters. 
31. Eighty-two of the intestate estates studied, or 36% of the total, included real 
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E. The Problem of Lapse and Substitutional Gifts 
Every testator, even of the simplest will, must decide whether to 
provide a substitutional gift in the event of the death of his bene-
ficiaries prior to his death. The historic law of lapsed legacies and 
devises is founded upon the canon of law and logic that property 
cannot be transferred to a dead person. Thus, the death of a bene-
ficiary prior to the testator's demise renders the legacy or devise 
ineffective and leaves the property affected to pass either under a 
residuary clause or by intestacy. Either result may be avoided if the 
testator provides a substitutional gift to take effect in the event a 
beneficiary predeceases him. If he makes no such provision, substitu-
tional gifts may still be provided by law under some circumstances. 
This, of course, is the import of the so-called lapse statutes, which 
exist in all but a few states. Except in two states, 32 however, these 
statutes are not framed so as to substitute the heirs of every bene-
ficiary who predeceases the testator. The Michigan statute, for in-
stance, is limited in scope to the death of "any child or other rela-
tion bf the testator," and substitutes only the issue, if any survive, 
of the deceased beneficiary unless the will directs otherwise.33 A 
simple class gift, moreover, has a built-in substitutional feature: 
those members of the class who predecease the testator lose their 
interests in favor of those who survive. This result is qualified where, 
as in Michigan, a lapse statute is applicable to class gifts.34 Under 
this qualification, a simple class gift requires no expression of alter-
native benefits to the issue of deceased class members or to the 
surviving takers when a class member dies without issue. It is 
not regarded as good drafting practice, however, to rely upon the 
rules of construction relating to class gifts or upon the proper appli-
cation of a lapse statute. 
In this study, 117 out of 187 wills contained one or more sub-
stitutional gifts. This number does not include wills in which the 
only provision against the lapse of specific or general legacies was 
in the form of a residuary clause.35 About one third of the wills 
estate among the assets. Of this number, the records in forty estates, or 49% of the 
total, revealed orders for the sale of real estate to pay debts or expenses, or to make 
distribution. 
32. Iowa and Maryland. See Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. REv. 856, 900, 
902 (1960). 
33. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 702.11 (1968). 
34. Strong v. Smith, 84 Mich. 567, 48 N.W. 183 (1891). 
35. It was not at all unusual to find in the sample wills which contained substitu-
tional specific and general legacies with no provision against lapse in the residuary 
clause. 
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which contained substitutional bequests devised simple gifts to 
individuals, with provision for either a single designated substitute 
beneficiary or a stated priority among two or more substitute bene-
ficiaries. 
The remaining two thirds of the wills in the sample illustrated 
the unexpected complications which can arise when- as is commonly 
the case-a testator wishes to make a gift to two or more persons 
but at the same time wishes to provide against the death of any one 
or more of them. At least two alternative substitutional provisions 
are commonly in his mind or should be brought to his attention: the 
first is a substitutional gift to the children or issue of a primary taker; 
the second is a substitutional gift to the primary takers who survive. 
Obviously these alternatives are not mutually exclusive; they may, 
and usually should, appear in combination. Moreover, other alter-
natives may be desired, including a gift to the spouse of a deceased 
taker. The possible permutations and combinations of these alterna-
tives pose a problem to the draftsman, the dimensions of which are 
seldom fully perceived. The result may be either ambiguity or a 
disposition which does not produce the result a testator would have 
intended if he were properly advised. The balance of this section is 
devoted to a survey of the manifestations of this problem which 
appeared in the Michigan sample. 
1. Patterns of Substitutional Gifts to Children, 
Issue, Heirs, and Survivors 
a. Simple class gifts. The sample revealed only five wills in which 
the testator made clearly identifiable class gifts without further 
provision for substitute takers. Three of these class gifts were them-
selves substitutional devises to the testators' children in the event that 
their spouses predeceased them. In all five cases the combination of 
the class-gift rule and the lapse statute would implicitly have pro-
vided both for the issue of a deceased class member and, if none, for 
the surviving class members. By resorting to so simple a disposition 
to achieve such results, however, the testators assumed the risk that 
a class-gift construction might not be adopted or that the lapse 
statute might not be applied. 
b. Gifts to individuals or survivors. In making a gift to two or 
more individuals, a testator may wish to inject into his disposition 
one of the ingredients of a class gift. Eighteen testators in the 
sample made gifts to two or more persons "or the survivor." It 
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should be noted that this language precludes the application of a 
lapse statute in favor of the issue of a deceased taker, unless the 
word "survivor" is so narrowly construed that it can be ignored in 
the event none of the designated takers survives. In those circum-
stances in which the protection of the issue of a deceased taker is 
not indicated-as when the testator makes gifts in small amounts, 
leaves personal chattels or household goods, or gives gifts to a hus-
band and wife, to collateral relatives, or to friends-simple provi-
sions of this sort may be perfectly proper. In all eighteen of the wills 
which contained such provisions, one or more of the enumerated 
factors was present. 
c. Substitutional gifts to issue or heirs. In four wills, class gifts 
were modified by substitutional gifts in favor of children, issue, or 
heirs, but not survivors. The first will contained a gift to the testa-
tor's children, with substituted gifts to the children of deceased 
children. Another will was similar, but embraced issue in both cir-
cumstances rather than children. The third will included a gift to 
the testator's children "and the issue of deceased children." This 
language does not make it entirely clear whether the testator meant 
to give property to his surviving issue per stirpes. The fourth devise 
to children "or their heirs." This bequest may be adequate to pro-
vide a complete disposition in a simple manner, provided the heirs 
of a deceased taker are ascertained, not at his death, but at the 
death of the testator; some courts have announced a rule of con-
struction to this effect.36 Still, one may well heed the admonition 
that a gift to the "heirs" of any person should be avoided unless 
that term is defined to resolve its inherent ambiguity. This usually 
implies that the testator should refer to a statute on intestate succes-
sion and specify the time when he wishes the ascertainment of heirs 
to occur. 
A number of other wills (twenty) contained nonclass gifts to two 
or more persons with substitutional provisions for the issue or chil-
dren of takers who predeceased the testator. As with the cases in the 
preceding paragraph, these provisions spell out consequences which 
in most cases would have been prescribed by the lapse statute in any 
event: But since the primary gifts were not to a class, there was no 
provision for the lapse of the interest of a taker who died without 
issue. This fact is especially significant in light of the further fact 
that in all but one of these wills, the primary gifts were residuary-
there were no additional residuary provisions. Under such circum-
36. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 732 (1956). 
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stances, the result of the death of a primary taker without issue is 
partial intestacy, a consequence which can be justified, if at all, only 
if the testator has consciously taken it into account in framing his 
scheme of disposition. 
d. Substitutional gifts to issue or survivors. In order to deal with 
the possibility that a primary beneficiary might predecease the testa-
tor without leaving issue, fourteen testators in the sample made 
gifts to two or more individuals (and in one case to a class) with 
substitutional gifts to the issue of predeceased primary takers or to 
the surviving takers if any should die without issue. This more 
complete type of disposition might suffice for many purposes if the 
first intended substitution were to the issue of predeceased primary 
takers per stirpes. Even if this were the intent, however, it leaves 
open the possibility of an unequal distribution among families in 
the event that one child should die leaving issue followed by the 
death of another child without issue. 
In one case the testator gave the property to his own heirs-at-law 
in the event that none of the primary or substituted takers should 
survive him. Some such end limitation is appropriate if the testator 
desires to make a complete provision against all contingencies, no 
matter how remote. 
e. Complete stirpital distribution. In only two wills in the sam-
ple did the testator avoid the problem of unequal distribution 
among family stocks. In one the testator left the residue of his estate 
to his six named children, the share of any who predeceased the 
testator to go to the deceased child's children; if, however, that child 
should die without leaving issue, the residue was to go to the sur-
viving cl1ildren of the testator "or to their issue by right of represen-
tation." Although the clarity of this language could have been 
improved, it comes close to expressing the complete stirpital distri-
bution among a testator's issue which most testators presumably 
would adopt if the complexities of this apparently simple type of 
gift were explained to them. Thus, if a taker died without issue, his 
share would be divided into as many parts as there were other pri-
mary takers who either survived or who died leaving surviving issue. 
f. Comment on these practices. It may be inferred that in many 
of the cases discussed above [in all categories except subsection (b)] 
the testator's intention could have been more simply and completely 
expressed by a gift to his surviving issue or lineal descendants per 
stirpes. Such a disposition implicitly covers all the substitutional 
possibilities except the death of all possible takers in all genera~ions. 
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When issue take per stirpes, issue of living issue are excluded, and 
issue of deceased issue take by representation. 
Many of the foregoing substitutional gifts to the issue of deceased 
takers were ambiguous because they omitted a stirpital designation. 
But even a limitation to "issue per stirpes" leaves one possible ques-
tion unresolved: a testator may desire that if all takers are in the 
same generation, they shall take equally. If so, he can easily qualify his 
gift to this effect. In the case of gifts taking effect at a testator's death, 
this would rarely present a problem: if all of the testator's children 
survived, clearly they would take in equal shares. To this extent 
every stirpital arrangement contains a per capita ingredient. Only 
if none of them survived would it be necessary to prescribe a per 
capita distribution among grandchildren. If, as in Michigan, the 
statute of intestate succession includes this per capita qualification,37 
it might be preferable for the testator to define the term "issue" by 
reference to this statute. 
2. Gifts to Spouses of Deceased Takers 
If a testator wants to introduce as a substitute legatee the spouse 
of a primary taker who predeceases him, the substitutional patterns 
discussed above are further complicated.38 The idea of substituting 
the spouse of a predeceased primary taker seems to be perfectly 
natural, particularly when the latter's issue are likely to be minors. 
It is surprising, therefore, that the sample included only five wills 
which contained express alternative provisions for the spouses of 
deceased legatees. The provisions of these wills reflected a variety of 
possibilities: in two of them, the testator made primary gifts to his 
children, with the share of any predeceased taker to go to his spouse, 
or if none, to his children (or issue). In another will, a stated sum out 
of the share of a deceased child was to go to his spouse and the 
balance to his children. In the fourth will, the testator reversed the 
priority between spouse and issue and stated a threefold set of alter-
37. The following form for a provision of this sort appears in W. LEACH, supra 
note 28, at 282: 
Where in this will any gift is made to issue of a person, those children and more 
remote descendants of such person shall take who would have taken the personal 
property of such person if he had died at the time said gift becomes possessory, un-
married, intestate, domiciled in ----, under the laws ---- in force at 
the time such gift becomes possessory, and the shares and proportions of taking shall 
be determined by said laws. 
38. The cases referred to under subsection (I) above in which substitutional gifts 
were made to the "heirs" of a deceased taker at least have the virtue of providing a 
widow's portion of a deceased taker's share. 
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natives: the children of a deceased taker were to take first, followed 
by his spouse, and for want of any of these, other primary takers 
who survived. In the final case, the testator left half of his residue 
to his son, but if he should predecease the testator, to his daughter-
in-law (the son's wife) and the issue of the son "equally and to the 
survivor of them." It is not clear, if put to a test, how this final 
disposition would have fared. 39 As indicated in the other four cases, 
a better solution would have been to establish a priority of sub-
stitution in favor either of the spouse or of the issue.40 
F. Common-Disaster Provisions 
Part of the problem of providing against the lapse of legacies or 
devises is the difficulty caused by the death of the testator and a 
beneficiary, usually his spouse, in a so-called "common disaster." 
Although the incidence of such events has increased markedly in 
our time, I am not aware of any appreciable increase in litigation 
caused by the factual problem of establishing the respective times 
of such deaths. Still, if the potential problem can be precluded by 
some standard form of testamentary clause, such a clause should 
take its place among the other common boilerplate provisions of 
a will, provided the draftsman takes account of the relative size of 
the estates of the testator and the beneficiary and the tax implica-
tions of those facts. Of course, in states which have adopted the 
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act41 (assuming one is satisfied with 
its terms) there is little reason to provide specifically for the com-
mon-disaster problem by will. According to that Act, a testator will 
be deemed to have survived a beneficiary if there is no sufficient 
evidence that the two died otherwise than simultaneously. 
39. Would the daughter-in-law take half of this portion and the issue the balance? 
Does "survivor" include her? Would she take any part of the share of a child who died 
leaving other children surviving? 
40. There is no simple form for covering all possible contingencies in dispositions 
which include both spouses and issue as substituted takers. But it can be done, at 
least if one avoids the complexities of providing for spouses beyond the first generation. 
One of the several possible arrangements might be as follows: 
The residue of my estate shall be divided into as many shares as there are children 
of mine who predecease me either leaving spouses who survive me or leaving issue 
but no spouses who survive me. I bequeath one share to each of my children who 
survives me, one share to the spouse of any child of mine who predeceases me, 
and one share to the issue per stirpes of any child of mine who predeceases me 
leaving no spouse who survives me. 
Of course, modifications of this language may be required to fit particular circum-
stances. For instance, if at the time of the making of the will any child of the testator 
had already died leaving a spouse or issue, a somewhat different arrangement would 
be needed. 
41. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. §§ 720.101-.108 (1968). 
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This study revealed only thirty-one wills, or seventeen per cent 
of the total, which contained common-disaster provisions. Several 
testators from among this group merely specified that the provision 
was to become operative upon the death of the testator and a ben-
eficiary in a common disaster. This obviously does not resolve the 
crucial question of the priority of death. Still less satisfactory were 
expressions found in two other wills which referred to deaths having 
occurred "simultaneously." Most of the wills, however, referred to 
lack of proof of survivorship as the circumstance which would give 
rise to the operation of the common disaster provision. Some of 
these wills contained such ambiguous expressions as the following: 
(1) if the legatee dies "under circumstances making it difficult or 
impossible to determine which has died first;" (2) if the legatee and 
the testator "die in a common disaster in which survivorship is not 
readily ascertained;" or (3) if the legatee and the testator die "as the 
result of a common disaster and there is a question as to which died 
first." Another more acceptable provision stated in terms of lack of 
proof appeared in one will which referred to the death of the testator 
and the beneficiary under circumstances in which "it cannot be 
determined by competent evidence which survived." The common-
disaster provisions themselves usually provided that the testator's 
property was to be given to a substituted beneficiary as though the 
testator were in fact the survivor. In a few instances there was a 
presumption that the testator survived; in two cases, the presump-
tion was reversed. 42 
Even the most satisfactory of the clauses stated in terms of proof 
of death seem to leave the question of survivorship to be resolved 
by litigation. In light of this shortcoming, there is current sentiment 
that the problem should be handled simply by imposing upon a 
beneficiary a condition of survivorship for a stated period of time 
beyond the death of the testator. Only five wills in the present sample 
contained provisions of this type. The time periods used ranged from 
one week to five months. Use of a relatively long period may suggest 
that the testator's purpose is not merely to cover a common disaster, 
but to prevent property from passing through two estate administra-
42. Two wills in which the presumption of survivorship was reversed disposed of 
substantial estates and contained marital deduction clauses. In one of these wills a 
separate bequest of household goods to the testator•s wife was accompanied by a 
substitutional gift if she were not living or had died in a common disaster with the 
testator. If death in a common disaster had occurred in this case, the marital deduction 
property might have ended in the wife's estate, while the chattels bequeathed to her 
outright might have passed to the substituted legatee. 
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tions in the event that a legatee does not live long enough to enjoy 
it. Perhaps the best practical solution to the simultaneous-death 
problem is the use of a short-term condition precedent of survivor-
ship. It goes without saying that if the testator employs such an ar-
rangement, he should pay particular attention to the alternative 
disposition of the property involved if the condition is not satisfied, 
especially when the requirement is imposed upon a class or a num-
ber of beneficiaries. When the testator seeks to take full advantage 
of the marital deduction, and perhaps in other special circumstances, 
a condition-of-survivorship provision will not be suitable. In this 
event, the draftsman may wish to fall back upon an acceptable form 
of a lack-of-proof type of provision, with a presumption that the 
beneficiary survived the testator.43 
G. Trusts and Future Interests 
Thirty-two wills, or seventeen per cent of the sample, contained 
dispositions in trust.44 The size of the estates involved is shown in 
table 4.45 
TABLE 4 
Distribution of Trust Estates by Value of Estate & Sex of Decedent 
Below 50,000 
50,000-99,999 
100,000-499,999 
Over 500,000 
Total 
Male Female Total 
5 
3 
10 
18 
5 
4 
4 
l 
14 
10 
7 
14 
I 
32 
(31%) 
(22%) 
(44%) 
(3%) 
There is nothing particularly surprising about these figures except 
the seemingly large number of estates less than 50,000 dollars in 
which trusts appeared. It should be noted, however, that no trusts 
were in fact created by ten of the thirty-two wills which explicitly 
43. The draftsmen of the new Uniform Probate Code have tentatively adopted a 
provision for legislative enactment which may resolve the problem for the draftsmen 
of average wills. Section 2-601 of the current draft provides: 
A devisee who fails to survive the testator by five full days is deemed to have 
predeceased the testator, unless the will of the decedent creates a presumption 
that the devfaee is deemed to survive the testator or requires that the devisee 
sunive the testator for any stated period in order to take under the will. 
44. In addition, one testatrix tried to impose upon her husband the duty to use 
property left to him to support the minor children of the testatrix by a previous 
marriage. It was not clear from the language that a trust was intended, and the court 
handled the problem by appointing guardians to receive the shares of the minor chil-
dren. 
45. The amounts shown in the table 4 represent the total values of the probate 
estates, not the value of trust estates created. 
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provided for trusts. Seven of these wills included substitutional 
trusts to take effect only if the testator's spouse predeceased him. 
Two wills devised property into trust in the event that certain 
beneficiaries were under age at the testator's death. And one created 
a trust which lapsed upon the death of the sole income beneficiary 
prior to the testator's death. Seven of these ten cases involved small 
estates, the largest of which was under 32,000 dollars. Thus, in seven 
of the ten estates listed in the below-50,000 dollar category, no trusts 
were actually created. In addition, an eighth will in the lowest value 
category included a small gift to the state in trust for the testator's 
mentally incompetent son who was a patient in a state institution.46 
Therefore, although the testators of ten small estates provided for 
trusts, only two of these actually resulted in a private trust adminis-
tration. 
The separation of the management from the enjoyment of 
property by means of a private trust generally appears in two recur-
rent patterns. The first pattern, in which the beneficial title to prop-
erty is divided into present and future interests, provides a family 
endmvment for a succession of at least two generations. Under this 
arrangement, there is an income interest for the life of one bene-
ficiary-usually the testator's widow-or perhaps a succession of 
such interests, followed by a remainder or alternative remainders 
consisting of the right to receive principal. The second pattern pro-
vides a trust administration for the benefit of persons who are under 
a designated age and who are entitled to principal upon the at-
tainment of the age. This arrangement may include the substitution 
of beneficiaries for those who die under that age. The age limitations 
are usually confined to the beneficiary's period of minority, but 
instances were noted in the sample in which the testator directed 
distribution of principal in whole or in part at ages twenty-three, 
twenty-five, thirty, and thirty-five. In one case, the testator directed 
installments of principal to be paid to his grandchildren upon their 
respectively attaining twenty-five, thirty, and thirty-five years of age. 
Of course, the two primary trust patterns noted here may appear 
in combination: in the present survey, thirteen cases appeared in 
the first category, thirteen in the second, and three in both categories. 
I. Personal or Professional Trustee? 
Testators designated corporate trust companies as trustees in 
fifteen wills, personal trustees in thirteen wills, and co-trustees of 
46. This gift was pursuant to a statute authorizing such gifts and specifying the 
procedure for their administration. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 330.46-.52 (1968). 
May 1969] Testate Succession 1331 
both types in two wills. Of the thirteen wills involving personal 
trustees, six named two persons as co-trustees. In all but one of the 
six cases, the trustees were children of the testator.47 Estates con-
taining trusts with personal trustees were valued below 100,000 
dollars in all but four cases. Two of these involved contingent trusts 
which never came into existence, and one involved a charitable 
trust which, by arrangements approved by the probate court during 
the course of administration, came into the hands of professional 
fiduciaries. 
2. Power to Invade Corpus 
It has become almost a standard practice of testators to vest a 
trustee with the power to sell and expend part or all of the trust 
corpus for the support or education of an income beneficiary. Such 
a provision appeared in twenty of the thirty-tw-o wills in this study. 
Unless the trust estate is large enough to assure adequate income, 
the omission of such a provision may produce a hardship which 
subverts the security sought by the creation of the trust. The only 
practicable way of providing this security is to vest in the trustee 
an almost unfettered discretion to sell corpus subject perhaps to the 
limitation that it be exercised for the support, maintenance, health, 
or education of the beneficiary. Such a clause appeared in all but 
one of the cases containing powers to invade corpus. Occasionally 
the standard of support was related to the beneficiary's "station in 
life" or to the life style "to which he is accustomed." In one case the 
trustee was authorized to use income and corpus to the extent neces-
sary to produce a stated annual sum. 
3. Spendthrift Trusts 
Spendthrift provisions appeared in nineteen out of the thirty-two 
wills. Ten of these expressly restrained alienation or anticipation of 
the beneficiary's interests in both income and principal.48 Nine 
others in the form of trusts for support could be construed to have 
47. One will named the testator's wife and two sons as co-trustees. 
48. In Michigan, a beneficiary of a trust for the receipt of rents and profits of land 
cannot transfer his interest, and his creditors can reach only the surplus of such rents 
and profits beyond the amount necessary for his education and support. MICH. COMP. 
LA.ws ANN. §§ 555.13, 555.19 (1968). To the extent provided, every such trust is a spend-
thrift trust. But the validity of a spendthrift provision respecting a beneficiary's in-
terest in the corpus of a trust is at least doubtful. In re Ford's Estate, 331 Mich. 220, 
49 N.W.2d 154 (1951). In fact, this case appears to stand for the proposition that if 
the beneficiary has an interest in the corpus, spendthrift provisions are void, even as 
to his interest in the income. w. FRATCHER, PERPETUITIES AND OTiiER REsrRAINTS 236 
(1955). 
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the same effect. In the latter cases, the beneficiary's enjoyment was 
expressly dependent upon the trustees' judgment as to the amounts 
required for support. 
4. Charitable Trusts 
In only one will in this sample did the testator create a charitable 
trust. In that case, the testator distributed all of his estate except the 
portion prescribed by law for his widow to a variety of charitable 
organizations. Some bequests were outright to charitable institu-
tions. One gift was to a named person in trust for the establishment 
and administration of a scholarship fund for needy graduates of a 
certain high school. Another bequest, essentially a pour-over gift 
into an existing trust fund, directed the executor to pay money over 
to the employees' pension fund of a bank. 
· 5. Marital Deduction Trusts 
Six wills were expressly designed to take advantage of the marital 
deduction for federal estate tax purposes. The estates involved were 
valued in two cases at slightly under 100,000 dollars, in two cases at 
approximately 170,000 dollars, in one case at over 440,000 dollars, 
and in one case at over 2,000,000 dollars. The marital deduction 
formula clauses utilized in each of the six wills followed the "pecu-
niary formula" in four cases (an amount equal to one half of the 
testator's adjusted gross estate) and the "fractional share formula" 
in the other two (that fractional share of the residue required to 
obtain the maximum marital deduction).49 Three of the six wills 
gave the marital deduction share to the spouse outright, with the 
balance in trust to the spouse for life50 and a remainder in the issue 
of the testators. The other three wills each created a typical "marital 
deduction trust" of the marital-deduction share for the spouse for 
49. In one of the pecuniary formula clauses, it was specified that the executor should 
apply the percentage to assets distributed at their fair market value at the time of 
distribution. In the three others it was provided only that values should be those 
finally determined for federal estate tax purposes. In one of these the executor was 
authorized to distribute wholly or partially in cash or in kind. Each of the two 
fractional share clauses directed that the amount of the bequest should be determined 
on the basis of values existing on the date of distribution, with an express direction 
that the marital bequest carry its proportionate part of the income of the testator's 
estate from the date of his death. Three of the six wills contained tax allocation 
clauses charging estate and inheritance taxes to the residue, two directed that such 
taxes should not be charged to the marital portions, and one contained no tax alloca-
tion clause. For a comprehensive commentary on the relative merits of the several 
marital deduction formula clauses, see Polasky, Marital Deduction Formula Clauses in 
Estate Planning-Estate and Income Tax Considerations, 63 M1cH. L. REv. 809 (1965). 
50. One variant included the testator's sister as a life beneficiary. 
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life. In the first of these, the testator also gave the spouse a general 
testamentary power of appointment, with a gift in default to a 
"residuary trust" for the benefit of designated issue of the testator. 
In the second, the testator gave his spouse a general testamentary 
power, in default of which the trust estate was to be poured over into 
an existing inter vivos trust. In the third, the testator gave his wife, 
in addition to her life interest in the marital-deduction trust, a 
general power of appointment over both income and principal, 
exercisable either in her lifetime or by will. In default of appoint-
ment, there was a gift by way of residuary trust, in which the wife 
was also life beneficiary, with a remainder to the testator's daughter 
or her issue. Presumably the testator designed this arrangement both 
to give his wife the life benefit of most of the probate estate and to 
relieve all but the marital-deduction share from the estate tax upon 
her death. 
6. Some Problems of Construction 
a. Trusts containing indefeasibly vested interests. When a 
trust is established in which the primary or remainder interest is 
subject to postponed enjoyment for a period of years ending upon 
the attainment of a certain age, the settlor must decide what to do 
about the survivorship problem. Does he wish to provide alternative 
gifts in the event a beneficiary dies under the stated age? If he does 
not, but prefers an indefeasibly vested gift with no condition of 
survivorship, the draftsman must exercise care in order to avoid 
language which could be construed to impose such a condition. This 
problem is complicated by the recurrent and unpredictable disposi-
tion of some courts to imply a condition of survivorship whenever 
a trustee is directed to pay principal to a beneficiary upon attain-
ment of a certain age. The kind of directions which appeared in 
three wills in the sample would seem to preclude any problem that 
a court might misconstrue the testator's intent. In those cases the 
testators made immediate gifts to designated issue, followed by the 
direction that if any beneficiary entitled to receive principal were 
a minor, his share was to be given to ( or retained by) a designated 
trustee. There were further directions for the use or payment of 
income during the period of the trust. 51 
51. In one of these cases, apparently in recognition that some problem might arise 
if such a beneficiary died under age, it was provided that on the death of any bene• 
ficiary during minority, those persons then entitled to receive principal would also 
receive any accumulation of income. Since no alternative takers were named, it may 
be inferred, although not beyond all doubt, that the estate of the deceased child would 
take his share of such principal and income. 
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In one case not involving any age limitation, the testator pro-
vided a substitutional trust for the benefit of his daughter in the 
event his wife predeceased him. The instrument directed the trustee 
to use income and corpus in his discretion for the daughter's sup-
port, but it specified neither the duration of the trust nor alternative 
beneficiaries. This sort of trust would present no problem in Eng-
land where-absent any rule like our Claflin doctrine52-such a 
beneficiary, if and when fully competent, could call at any time for 
termination of the trust and a conveyance of the corpus. Under our 
law, a trust cannot be terminated so long as a substantial purpose of 
the trust remains unsatisfied. Most American draftsmen, therefore, 
assume that they must indicate a date of termination by a specific 
direction on the payment of principal. In fact, most American trusts 
not only divide ownership of property into managerial and bene-
ficial interests, but also divide beneficial interests into rights to in-
come and rights to receive principal. Often the trust directs income 
to be paid to a beneficiary for his lifetime; in such a case, a direction 
to pay principal thereafter to someone else is properly designated 
as a remainder. In this manner, it is appropriate and convenient to 
regard the doctrine of estates as having been extended to the division 
of beneficial interests under a trust. 
Suppose, however, that a settlor wishes to give a person the full 
beneficial title to property while limiting his enjoyment to a right 
to receive income for life. The beneficiary's interest in corpus in 
such a case would consist of a power to direct its devolution rather 
than a right to receive it from the trustee. Conceptually an interest 
so limited has no exact analogy in the doctrine of estates, but there 
is nothing in the law of trusts to preclude such an arrangement. It 
would appear that the only real problem is how the draftsman can 
clearly express the testator's complete donative intention. How does 
one negate the implication that, by giving the beneficiary an interest 
for life, the intention is to give him no more than an equitable life 
estate? It is disconcerting, if not conducive to misinterpretation, to 
direct that the principal shall be paid to him at his death. A direc-
tion to pay principal to his heirs will also not produce the intended 
result, for it reduces his interest to a life interest with a succession 
of interests thereafter which is beyond his control. Some draftsmen 
in such a case may resort to the dubious device of directing the 
trustee to pay principal to the beneficiary's "estate."53 A better solu-
52. Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889). 
53. See Fox, Estate: A. Word To Be Used Cautiously, If at A.ll, 81 HARv. L. R.Ev. 
992 (1968). 
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tion, which appeared in several of the trusts with age limitations 
noted above, would be to bequeath the property to the beneficiary 
subject to the stipulation that for a stated period such property 
should be held by a trustee and administered according to certain 
directions. These directions would include no provisions for the 
payment of principal other than perhaps a discretionary power in 
the trustee to invade principal for the beneficiary's support. 
Only two cases in this survey contained trusts in the simple form 
of income interests for life with directions to pay principal to one 
or more named persons as remaindermen. In the absence of other 
language, such remainders are indefeasibly vested, that is, not sub-
ject to any condition of survivorship until the time of distribution. 
One may be discomfitted by language which directs payment to 
persons who may not be alive, but if our basic constructional dogma 
against implying conditions of survivorship has any force when 
future interests are limited in trust, one should be able to rely on 
that dogma in the case of such simple directions as these. The testa-
tor can, of course, insure this interpretation by inserting an explan-
atory statement that he intends such remainder interests to be 
indefeasibly vested and subject to no condition of survivorship. 
b. Contingent future interests. Twenty out of the thirty-two 
trusts in this survey contained contingent future interests limited 
either after life interests or upon the failure by primary beneficiaries 
to survive to a stated age. All but two of these trusts either limited 
remainders to the issue of the respective testators, or created trusts 
for the benefit of children under stated ages with future interests 
limited over to other issue. Many of the drafting problems noted 
above in connection with substitutional provisions against lapse 
apply here as well. Principally, the problem is to identify and pro-
vide for all contingencies relating to the birth and death of bene-
ficiaries during the trust period. 
In six of the thirty-two trusts examined, the intention of the 
testator might have been more simply expressed by limiting a re-
mainder to his "issue per stirpes then living," with the possible 
qualification that if all takers were in the same generation, they 
would take per capita. Instead, intricate and in some instances in-
complete alternatives were specified. In one instrument, for exam-
ple, the testator limited a remainder to his son and daughter or the 
survivor or the living children of each. Among other ambiguities, 
this language did not cover the event of the death of both benefi-
ciaries without children, or the death of one leaving children fol-
lowed by the death ·of the other without children. 
1336 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:I!I0!I 
In several cases, trust instruments granted future interests to 
two or more persons with supplanting limitations to the issue or 
children of any who died before such interests became possessory 
but without any further alternative provisions. In all but one of 
these cases, the language seemed to describe vested remainders sub-
ject to defeasance in favor of the remaindermen's issue. Properly 
construed, such language implies that if a remainderman dies before 
the stated time without leaving issue, his remainder is not defeated 
and remains in his estate. Even when this is the result intended, 
such cryptic expressions invite controversy. 54 
Because the construction of the many possible variations of 
alternative or supplanting limitations is unpredictable, the safest 
practice is to make all future interests of this sort, including the 
primary gift, subject to express conditions precedent of survivor-
ship. 55 Taken together-in conjunction perhaps with an end-limita-
tion to the testator's heirs-these conditions would presumably ex-
haust all possibilities relating to the birth or death of potential 
beneficiaries. One testator, for instance, effectively handled this 
problem by providing that upon the death of his son (a life bene-
ficiary of part of the residue), the trust estate was to be divided into 
"as many equal parts as there are children of (this son) and of (an-
other deceased son) then living and deceased children of my sons 
leaving issue then living," with distribution accordingly. There was 
also an end limitation to the testator's heirs then living.56 
Substantially the same effect can be achieved, however, by using 
a remainder which, although vested, is subject to defeasance upon 
death prior to distribution. Of course, care must be taken to provide 
alternative interests which, singly or together, cover without ambi-
guity every circumstance which may arise upon the death of primary 
54. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 36, at § 583; 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 
21.23 (A. Casner ed. 1952). One extremely careless piece of drafting appeared in a 
will which limited the remainder, after a life interest in the testator's wife, to his 
three children: "and if none of said children shall be then living, but has issue of hers 
or his surviving, the issue shall take the share of such deceased daughter or son of 
mine equally" (emphasis added). 
55. Halbach, Future Interests: Express and Implied Conditions of Survival, 49 
CALIF. L. REv. 297, 465 (1961). 
56. It would have been better to provide for the ascertainment of heirs as of the 
end of the life interest rather than simply to refer to "my heirs at law then living.'' 
The latter is subject to a construction calling for ascertainment of the heirs at the 
ancestor's death subject to the further requirement that they survive the life bene-
ficiary. Cf. In re Love's Estate, 362 P. 105, 66 A.2d 238 (1949). It should be noted 
further that this disposition effectively designated the testator's grandchildren (those 
living and those dead leaving issue) as the heads of the stocks of what is essentially a 
gift to the testator's own issue, and provided that division in that generation was to 
be in equal shares. A simple gift to the testator's issue per stirpes would not have 
been completely free of ambiguity under some possible circumstances. 
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remaindermen. Several wills which required that primary takers 
survive to a certain age were carefully drawn to this effect. 
c. Separate trusts with age limitations. In one case in the survey, 
the testator left remainders in separate trusts for each of his three 
grandchildren to continue until each attained age thirty. In the 
event of death before that age, the trust provided for alternative 
gifts in favor of the issue of each. But if any died without issue, his 
share was to be divided among the remaining trusts. Not only is this 
disposition incomplete, but serious inequalities between the family 
stocks could result under certain circumstances. What would hap-
pen, for example, if one of the grandchildren were to die without 
issue and all the other trusts had ended or if one but not both of the 
other trusts had ended? 
In another case the testator limited remainder interests to his 
children-the share of any children under twenty-five to be held in 
trust-with alternative gifts over of the shares of any children who 
died under twenty-five. Although this disposition was complete, the 
gift-over provisions required the payment of principal outdght, even 
to a living child under twenty-five who was then only an income 
beneficiary. 
A third case effectively avoided both of these difficulties by limit-
ing remainder interests to three grandchildren and by providing al-
ternatives upon the death of a grandchild under a stated age. These 
.ilternatives called for distribution in favor of a deceased grand-
child's issue, or if none, in favor of other grandchildren or the living 
issue of those then deceased. There was an added direction that if 
at the time of any such distribution any one of the grandchildren 
was the beneficiary of a separate trust, his share of the gift over was 
to be added thereto. 
d. Distribution when the youngest beneficiary attains a stated 
age. In several of the wills examined, the testator imposed an age 
limitation by providing for distribution of principal when the 
youngest member of a class attained a stated age or died under that 
age; income was to be payable to the class in the meantime. In this 
type of disposition, care must be taken to provide for the full dis-
position of income in the event one of the beneficiaries dies prior to 
the termination date. The following examples of this problem, 
drawn from the sample, will illustrate the point. In one case, income 
was payable in designated shares to each beneficiary who attained 
twenty-one; corpus was to be distributed to the beneficiaries "or to 
their children by right of representation" when the youngest at-
tained twenty-five. It can be inferred from this disposition that if 
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one beneficiary, having attained twenty-one, should die before 
reaching twenty-five or while any of the others were still under 
twenty-five, his share of the income should either be paid to his chil-
dren, if any, or distributed as if the income interest were property 
vested in him at the time of his death. Neither alternative, however, 
is free of doubt. In a second case, the testator limited a remainder 
to persons who survived a life beneficiary; income was to be paid to 
them and principal distributed when all attained twenty-one. Under 
this disposition, both the interest in income and in principal of one 
who died after the end of the life interest but before all attained 
twenty-one would be payable to his estate. A third will was carefully 
drawn to call for immediate distribution to alternative takers of the 
share in the corpus of any primary beneficiary who died before all 
such beneficiaries attained the age of twenty-three. In other words, 
the death of any primary taker would abrogate pro tanto the direc-
tion to postpone distribution until all attained the stated age. Per-
haps the simplest solution to this problem would be to vest the 
trustee with a broad discretion to "sprinkle" income during the term 
of the trust among a group consisting of the primary beneficiaries 
and their issue. 
3. Perpetuity Problems 
We may have been led to believe by much that has been said in 
recent years that testators' intentions have frequently been frus-
trated by careless violations of the Rule Against Perpetuities. I 
strongly endorse the admonition that one who is not well grounded 
in this doctrine should not attempt to draft any but the simplest of 
wills. But the wills reviewed in this study support the proposition 
that perpetuity violations are rare. Perpetuity reform, if it is needed 
at all, can be justified by the value of salvaging those cases in which 
violations, however few, do occur; but this does not mean that the bar 
stands in need of rescue from a maze of incomprehensible doctrine. 
Indeed, I have the impression from the cases examined in this survey 
that the draftsmen involved knew their way around the old pitfalls. 
The sample also gives me the impression that normal testamentary 
objectives seldom lead a draftsman into confrontation with the more 
notorious of the old bugaboos.57 For example, testators normally do 
not leave property to persons living at the time of the probate of 
their wills or the settlement of their estates. Nor is one likely to en-
57. The classic categorization of these pitfalls was made in Leach, Perpetuities in a 
Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638 (1938). See also 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 24.21· 
.23 (A. Casner ed. 1952); Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. 
REv. 973 (1965). 
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counter those attenuated family arrangements which invoke the 
perils of the "fertile octogenarian" and his company. Instead, most 
perpetuity violations may be laid on the doorstep of eccentric testa-
tors and their counsellors who are not alert to the dangers of ab-
normal family arrangements. 
Many wills in this study prescribed distribution of principal 
upon the termination of life interests. If, as is usually the case, life 
beneficiaries are limited to named persons in being at the death of 
the testator, virtually all perpetuity problems are avoided. The most 
obvious and likely danger occurs when the testator postpones the 
vesting of an interest to take account of age limitations which exceed 
twenty-one years. As noted above, several such examples appeared 
in this study. But for the most part, the draftsmen involved seemed 
to be alert to the problem; indeed, it can be stated almost as a 
general proposition that the draftsmen confined age requirements 
to the children of a testator or to other persons living at the time 
of his death. Obviously, when indefeasibly vested interests are 
given with age requirements clearly limited to the postponement 
of enjoyment, no such practice is necessary. 
One problem encountered in this study, however, appears to be 
neither obvious nor unusual. This problem relates to the normal 
desire of a testator to provide for the spouse, as well as the issue, of 
a primary b~neficiary who dies before a postponed date of distribu-
tion. Here, of course, one confronts the booby-trap of the infamous 
"unborn widow." If a testator wants to introduce someone's spouse 
as a future beneficiary for life with further contingent limitations, 
the difficulty lies in the remote possibility that such spouse will not 
have been living at the testator's death. In one case in this survey 
a testatrix limited remainder interests to her four children with 
typical supplanting limitations in favor of issue in the event that 
any should die before distribution. But if any child should die 
without leaving issue, the instrument gave a life interest to his 
spouse, with similar alternatives upon the spouse's death. The 
draftsman, however, was aware of the perpetuity problem involved, 
for he inserted a saving provision which directed termination of the 
trust in any event upon the death of the survivor of the testatrix's 
husband and all her children living at the time of her death. This 
saving clause might have been made even more secure by including 
among the measuring lives all issue of the testatrix living at her 
death.58 In another case the will was virtually identical, but con-
58. It is noted that this will was probated in an ancillary proceeding, and ap-
parently was drafted in California. 
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tained no saving clause. The trust, which is now being administered, 
therefore, contains interests which violate the Rule Against Per-
petuities. 59 
4. Powers of Appointment 
Besides the general powers of appointment encountered in the 
marital deduction trusts mentionad above,60 I discovered only two 
other powers of appointment in the sample, neither of which was 
typical. In one case the testator directed the executor to distribute 
personal property according to informal directions, but if any poten-
tial beneficiary refused to accept those directions, he left distribution 
in the discretion of the executor. In another case the testator left 
the residue of his estate to his brother in trust to distribute in his 
discretion among the testator's children. In choosing among the chil-
dren, the brother was to be guided by his finding as to whether they 
had accorded the testator during his lifetime such attention as is 
normal between parent and child. To the extent that this small 
sample is representative, either the value of powers of appointment 
for other than tax objectives-specifically their value to provide for 
a flexible succession of family property-has not yet impressed the 
practicing bar or testators still cling to a measure of inflexibility. 
H. Legal Future Interests 
The division of ownership into present and future legal estates 
is a practice that should be avoided whenever possible, particularly 
when personal property is involved. The reason relates to the def-
inition of, or the means for assuring proper protection to, the rights 
of future interest holders. This is essentially a modern problem, 
growing out of the courts' extension of the doctrine of legal estates 
in land to personal property. In the setting of the trust, this evolu-
tion has served to prevent the intolerable inconvenience of having 
to work with two distinct doctrines of estates. The lesson, of course, 
is that the creation of present and future interests in personal prop-
erty should be confined to the setting of the trust. If the value of 
the property involved does not justify resort to a trust administra-
tion, the property should be bequeathed outright. 
It is perfectly normal for a testator to wish to leave his home to 
his wife for life. A legal life estate in rental property may also make 
59. No point has so far been made of this during the course of administration. In 
fact, if the three sons of the testatrix survive her husband, the violation will become 
irrelevant. 
60. See text following note 50 supra. 
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sense if the life tenant is one to whom the management of the 
property can safely be entrusted. The difficulty is that there is no 
assurance that the income from the property will provide sufficient 
support for the life tenant. Indeed, over the period of a lifetime it 
may become necessary to sell the land and either reinvest the pro• 
ceeds or expend them in order to assure adequate support for the 
intended beneficiary. In either case the sale of land produces per-
sonal property and the need for a trust to assure its proper manage-
ment. If a trust is not desired initially, it is possible for a testator to 
empower a life tenant to sell the property and hold the proceeds in 
trust for himself and the remaindermen. Alternatively, he may 
authorize the life tenant to convey the property to a trustee who is 
in turn empowered to sell it and administer the proceeds. Either 
device requires considerable elaboration and care in the drafting, 
and to my knowledge is seldom, if ever, employed. The simplest 
disposition of real property is to devise it in fee simple-an alterna-
tive which, because it removes the dead hand's control over the 
ultimate descent of property, may have more than simplicity to 
commend itself in healthy family circumstances. 
I discovered only ten wills in the sample which purported to 
create legal present and future interests in real property. In each of 
three cases the testator gave his spouse a life estate in his place of 
residence with a remainder to issue. In two more cases the testator 
gave his daughter a life estate in farm land with a remainder to his 
other issue. One testatrix with an estate valued at over 400,000 dol-
lars left all her real estate to her husband for life with a remainder, 
together with one half of the residue of her estate, in trust for her 
issue. Another testatrix left all of her estate. including both real 
and personal property, to her husband for life with remainders to 
issue, but the husband died first and the remainders were acceler-
ated. 
Only two wills employed the device of bequeathing the residue, 
including both real and personal property, to the testator's wife for 
life together with a power to sell and consume for support. This 
dubious device became common in some regions during the last 
century-presumably a reflection of the traditional rural American 
resistance to the trust. The result was a proliferation of confusing 
case law in which the courts struggled with many badly drafted pro-
visions. These provisions often left in doubt the nature of the estates 
in the respective spouses, the nature or scope of the attendant pow-
ers, and the consequences of their exercise. Happily, this does not 
seem to remain a significant problem in Michigan. 
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I. Joint and Mutual Wills 
A joint and mutual will61 is fraught with such potential contro-
versy concerning its legal effects, such uncertainty about what makes 
it "joint" or "mutual" or both, that one wonders what would move 
anyone to resort to such a device. One reason may be no more than 
the convenience of using one instrument when the testators' testa-
mentary objectives are identical or reciprocal. It is more likely, 
however, that the parties intend to bind themselves in a manner 
that is inconsistent with the rules relating to the revocability of wills. 
If so, they may make an agreement-usually referred to as a contract 
not a revoke-which purports to limit their ability severally to 
abrogate their joint endeavor. They may, and surely should, reduce 
such an agreement to writing and expressly refer to it in the will. If 
the will does not recite the contractual arrangements, the court may 
nonetheless discover a contract.either by implication from the execu-
tion of a joint and mutual will or from that fact plus other evi-
dence.62 Obviously, if the parties actually intend to bind one another 
to adhere to their common objective, they can express their testa-
mentary desires as well by two wills as by one. 
The real question is: Why do the spouses wish to bind them-
selves in such a manner? It may be inferred that one or both of the 
parties is concerned about the ultimate devolution of individual 
or jointly held property after its enjoyment by the survivor. If the 
assurance of economic benefits to other members of the family is the 
source of concern, the use of a trust or the division of ownership 
into life estates and remainders by will or inter vivos disposition will 
probably not be desirable when the value of the estate is small. Out-
right inter vivas or testamentary gifts to the testators' children will 
also not be acceptable, particularly when, in respect to gifts by will, 
the spouse has an election to take against the will. We may therefore 
expect that some spouses with modest resources will assume the risks 
of a joint and mutual will supported by a contract as the least ob-
jectionable of the available dispositive devices for reaching their 
common objective. Despite the risks of failure, the device may have 
at least some in terrorem force against the temptation of the sur-
viving spouse to subvert the ultimate objective. 
61. For present purposes, a joint and mutual will may be defined as one which 
purports to pass the property of two persons, generally husband and wife; the will 
is usually executed by both and contains provisions which are at least in part recipro• 
cal. 
62. B. SPARKS, CoNTRAcrs To MAKE WILLS 28-38 (1956); Partridge, The R~ocability 
of .Mutual and Reciprocal Wills, 77 U. PA. L. REY. 357, 360 (1929). 
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If the surviving testator is free to dispose of his own property in 
his lifetime, however, the restrictive effect of a joint and mutual will 
cannot be achieved merely by denying him the power to revoke his 
own will. The courts seem to have evolved limitations which pro-
hibit the survivor from unreasonably consuming or disposing of his 
own property with the intention to subvert the arrangement.63 The 
inherent unpredictability of the result when such matters are con-
tested casts further doubt upon the value of the joint and mutual 
will. Even more uncertain is the question of the proper remedy 
where one has exceeded his powers. 
Only four joint and mutual wills were found in this sample, and 
only one of these recited that it was made pursuant to a contract for 
the disposition of the spouses' property. All were probated in estates 
valued at less than 35,000 dollars. One will was completely recipro-
cal in the sense that no interests were given to anyone other than 
the testators themselves, which in effect left the survivor as absolute 
owner. The three other wills covered personal property of the de-
ceased spouse. To the extent that a joint and mutual will covers 
personal property, it is subject to the objection noted elsewhere 
concerning the creation of legal future interests in personal prop-
erty. 64 
In addition to the four wills mentioned above, two other wills 
were noted which, although not joint, recited that the disposition 
was pursuant to an agreement between the spouses. The estate 
probated under each of these wills was valued at less than 7,000 dol-
lars. One will devised the testatrix's place of residence to the hus-
band for life with remainder to a son, and left everything else to the 
son outright. The real estate was not inventoried in the estate, 
presumably because it was jointly held. If so, the question may re-
main whether the language of this will, together with the contract 
under which it was made, serve to bind the husband so as to render 
him a simple life tenant, or whether he would have the power to 
sell and consume under certain unspecified circumstances. 
All of these wills, except the one which was completely recipro-
cal, left for possible future adjudication the rights and duties of the 
surviving spouses. This justifies the admonition that the joint and 
mutual will is better avoided altogether. It appears to be a device 
resorted to by persons of small means to achieve what affluent per-
sons can achieve by more efficient devices. This suggests a deficiency 
6~. B. SPARKS, supra note 62, ch. V. 
64. See pt. I. H. supra. 
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in our law for meeting a normal family objective: assurance that 
jointly held property or the combined property of the spouses is 
kept within the family without prejudice to the needs of the sur-
viving spouse. 
J. Conditions against Contest 
Only two wills in the entire sample imposed conditions against 
contest covering attempts by beneficiaries either to set aside the 
will or to assert claims against the estate. Each will reduced to one 
dollar the bequest to any beneficiary who breached the condition. 
Both wills were made by women, neither of whom left a surviving 
husband. One testatrix was survived by a daughter and her four 
children. The estate was to be divided among a number of relatives, 
including the daughter and her children. The other testatrix left 
no issue, and her heirs were three nephews and one niece. She left 
the residue of her estate to the niece and two of the three nephews; 
the third nephew received a small general bequest. The two cases 
suggest that a no-contest condition is typically used when there is 
a plan of unequal distribution among a testator's heirs or when one 
such beneficiary is given appreciably less than a normal portion. 
II. SUCCESSION BY WILL IN ENGLAND: SOME COMPARISONS 
The commentary below on current English testamentary prac-
tices is, for the most part, based upon an examination of one hun-
dred wills selected at random from the Principal Probate Registry 
for the year 1963. This examination revealed two distinctive features 
of English testamentary practice: (1) the use of the trust, usually in 
the form of the so-called "trust for sale," throughout a broader spec-
trum of dispositive patterns than in American practice; and (2) the 
use of a common form of substitutional provision for the issue of 
deceased legatees which exhibits a policy of avoiding the devolution 
of any property to minors. An explanation of both of these features 
requires a brief summary of the distinctive character which English 
law and practice have taken since the parting of our two legal 
systems. 
A. Background of English Property Law 
The major purpose of the extraordinary English property law 
reform of 1925 was to eliminate all fetters upon the alienability of 
land. The Law of Property Act65 abolished all legal estates in land 
other than the fee simple absolute and the term of years absolute. 
65. 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 1. 
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All other interests can be created only in equity, that is, as bene-
ficial interests in trust. Other provisions authorized two devices for 
creating successive beneficial interests in land: a settlement under 
the Settled Land Act of 192566 and a "trust for sale" under the Law 
of Property Act. A proper settlement under the former Act vests 
the legal title and full power of disposition over land, subject to 
elaborate regulations, in the so-called "tenant for life" -the person 
of full age who, for the time being, is beneficially entitled to posses-
sion of the land for his life. The tenant for life in effect holds the 
land in trust for himself and for others to whom beneficial interests 
have been given, so that upon the sale of settled land the capital 
fund produced thereby will be preserved for all interested parties. 
A settlement, however, must also provide for trustees who have 
certain residual powers and duties not conferred upon the tenant 
for life, including the power to receive and hold "capital money" 
and to give consent to certain transactions. A settlement therefore 
requires the execution of two instruments, a vesting deed and a 
trust instrument. By this device the legal title is kept unfettered by 
the terms of the settlement. A will may serve as a trust instrument, 
but upon the testator's death the trustees of the settlement must 
execute a vesting deed to the person who has the status of tenant for 
life. Because of the cumbersome machinery required for creating a 
settlement of land, this device has been used with diminished fre-
quency in recent years; it is rarely used in the testamentary disposi-
tion of land. 
The second device for creating limited or successive beneficial 
interests in land is the "trust for sale," which is authorized and 
elaborately regulated by the Law of Property Act. This device closely 
resembles a trust in the traditional sense; full legal title is vested in 
trustees, who are given all the powers of both the tenant for life and 
the trustees of a settlement under the Settled Land Act. But the trust 
must be a binding trust to sell-not merely a power to sell-so that 
the interests of beneficiaries become interests in a capital fund 
rather than in the land itself. The fact that this conversion must 
occur, however, does not prevent the testator from conferring upon 
trustees the power to postpone sale indefinitely in their discretion; 
in fact, such power of postponement is implied unless a contrary 
intention appears from the trust instrument. Moreover, it is per-
fectly consistent with such a trust for the testator to direct the 
trustees to permit a beneficiary to possess land and not to sell it 
without his consent. Thus, it is possible to impose a greater measure 
66. 15 Geo. 5, c. 18. 
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of restraint upon the sale of land by means of a trust for sale than 
by a settlement under the Settled Land Act. Nevertheless, the trust 
for sale is particularly appropriate when the testator's objective is 
to establish a capital fund for the production of income for the 
objects of his bounty. And since testamentary dispositions of this 
type often do not discriminate between real and personal property, 
the trust for sale is peculiarly adapted to estates consisting in whole 
or in part of personal property.67 When land is involved, a tradi-
tional trust cannot be used, and any attempt to create such a trust 
results in a settlement under the Settled Land Act. When only per-
sonal property is involved, a traditional trust may be, and sometimes 
is, still utilized. But in practice, the trust for sale is the predominant 
device for family endowments in England. Such trusts are invariably 
declared by the following standard form with occasional variations 
in language: 
I give, devise and bequeath the whole of my estate both real and 
personal whatsoever and wheresoever situate unto my trustees upon 
trust to sell, call in and convert the same into money with full power 
to postpone such sale, calling in and conversion thereof so long as 
they in their absolute discretion think fit without being liable for 
loss and out of the moneys arising from such sale, calling in and 
conversion thereof or of any ready moneys to pay my debts, funeral 
and testamentary expenses and To Hold the net proceeds thereof 
In Trust for . . . . 
To understand fully the distinctive features and functions of the 
trust in English practice, it is necessary to note certain other features 
of English trust law. Of greatest significance is the doctrine of 
Saunders v. Vautier,68 which contrasts with the American Claflin 
doctrine. 69 
According to the Claflin doctrine, no trust can be terminated so 
long as any significant trust objective remains unsatisfied. The sup-
posed rationale of this rule is that a settlor has the right to dispose 
of his own property with such restrictions as he sees fit, to the extent 
that they are not contrary to law or public policy. In Saunders, 
however, the court held that a legatee who had reached twenty-one 
could demand payment of a vested legacy which the will did not 
make payable until he reached twenty-five. This and similar cases 
have been taken to mean that any trust is terminable by a single 
67. Since the term "trust for sale" normally implies that the subject matter is 
land, when the form is used to include personal property it is often referred to as a 
trust to sell and convert. 
68. 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ch. 1841). 
69. Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889). See text accompanying 
note 52 supra. 
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legally competent beneficiary who has a vested interest, without re-
gard to the directions of the settlor or the wishes of the trustee. The 
same is true if all legally competent concurrent or successive bene-
ficiaries agree upon termination. 
The rationale of the English rule is not entirely clear. It has been 
said that a trust is the equitable equivalent of a common law gift; 
once declared, the settlor has no further rights over the property.70 
Although such an explanation is less than satisfactory, it does seem 
clear that the English emphasis is upon the status of the beneficiary 
as the present owner of property rather than upon the power of 
a settlor as former owner to fetter the property in the hands of his 
donees. This may or may not represent a policy judgment by the 
English courts upon the extent to which the "dead-hand" can con-
trol the future enjoyment of property.71 It is not necessary for pur-
poses of this Article to evaluate the basic differences between Ameri-
can and English philosophy on this particular aspect of trust law. It 
is enough to say that the adherence of the English to the traditional 
rule reflected in Saunders is probably the most significant of the 
doctrinal bases for their modern trust practices. 
This survey of English trust law would not be complete without 
brief reference to two statutes-the Trustee Investments Act of 
196172 and the Trustee Act of 192573-which govern the administra-
tion of trusts generally. Particular attention is called to section 31 
of the Trustee Act of 1925, which authorizes a trustee holding prop-
erty during the infancy of any beneficiary to pay to his parent or 
guardian, or to apply towards his maintenance and education, such 
of the income as may in all the circumstances be reasonable. More-
over, if such a beneficiary upon attaining twenty-one does not have 
a vested interest in the property, the Act directs the trustee to pay 
the income to him until he either acquires a vested interest or until 
his interest fails. These specific provisions apply only to a gift which 
"carries the intermediate income": to all contingent or future spe-
cific or residuary bequests and devises, and to general bequests and 
devises in which the testator is in loco parentis to the legatee.u 
This statutory apparatus, together with the body of common law 
70. A. UNDERHILL, I.Aw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 444 (11th ed. 1959). 
71. It may be relevant to note in respect to the American doctrine that the Claflin 
case was decided by the same court which, at very nearly the same time, handed down 
the leading case announcing the doctrine of spendthrift trusts, which has only limited 
acceptance in England. Broadway Natl. Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 43 AM. REP. 
504 (1882). 
72. 9 &: 10 Eliz. 2, c. 62. 
73. 15 Geo. 5, c. 19. 
74, A. UNDERHILL, supra note 70, at 455. 
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trust doctrine and judicial construction which accompanies it, per-
mits settlors to declare trusts in very simple terms. 
The English bar seems to have escaped most of the refinements 
which have produced controversies in the United States about 
whether a trust is active or passive.75 This may reflect in part the 
effect of the rule in Saunders v. Vautier. If the beneficiaries of a 
trust can terminate it whenever all the interests are vested in them, 
there is little need for a settlor to specify the duration of his trust in 
terms of express active duties of the trustee. Moreover, it appears 
that what we call a "dry" trust is called a "simple" trust in England. 
A simple trust is one in which the trustee's only duty is to convey 
the property to beneficiaries.76 By implying such a duty, the English 
courts have escaped the problem of deciding whether the settlor has 
kept his trust active. Thus, while American draftsmen typically de-
clare the substantive provisions of a trust by carefully describing the 
extent of the trustee's duties with respect to the several beneficiaries, 
English draftsmen may simply designate the beneficiary or a succes-
sion of beneficiaries. 
It is also relevant that under English law, with some exceptions, 
trustees are not entitled to compensation for their services. Although 
a settlor may provide compensation for his trustee-and will nor-
mally do so when the circumstances indicate the advisability of 
appointing a professional trustee-the circumstances generally tend 
to encourage the appointment of relatives, friends, or solicitors.77 
Finally, the administration of decedents' and trust estates in 
England tends to be informal and unsupervised; with rare excep-
tions, a court will intervene for remedial, but not for supervisory, 
purposes. 
B. The English Sample: Common Provisions and some Implications 
Of the one hundred English wills examined in this study, thirty 
included dispositions of all or the residue of the testator's estate 
upon trusts for sale.78 Eleven other wills contained trusts which were 
75. The Law of Property Act repealed the Statute of Uses in England. But the mere 
inapplicability of that Statute to personal property in the United States has not 
prevented American courts from finding that a trust of personal property has termi-
nated because it has become passive or "dry" G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 206 
(2d ed. 1965). 
76. A. UNDERHILL, supra note 70, at 12. 
77. Unless provided otherwise by the will, a solicitor is not entitled to compensation 
for services which could be performed by someone not a solicitor. A. UNDERHILL, supra 
note 70, at 385. 
78. Five of the thirty wills also included trusts not for sale. The informal nature 
of English estate administration does not produce public records which reveal the 
nature of the property covered by these trusts. 
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not trusts for sale, including one will which declared a charitable 
trust. Five more wills, which did not expressly declare trusts, never-
theless included dispositions which would require trust administra-
tion. The testators in these cases followed the common practice of 
appointing persons to act as both executors and trustees. Thus, the 
percentage of wills creating trusts in the English sample is more 
than two-and-one-half times that in the Michigan sample. But this 
data must be immediately qualified by what I think is a fair observa-
tion on the English sample: only fourteen of the forty-six English 
wills which used a trust device revealed testamentary objectives of 
the kind which would normally induce an American testator to 
create a trust. Such a categorical proposition requires some explana-
tion, which is offered in the various observations on English practice 
that appear below. 
I. Dispositions not in Trust 
More than one half of the English wills examined either disposed 
outright of all of the testator's estate, or contained outright gifts in 
a variety of specific, general, or residuary bequests or devises. These 
wills are not readily distinguishable from an even larger majority 
of such wills in the Michigan sample. It does appear that more 
English testators are content to make their wills by inserting hand-
written substantive language into standard printed forms; twenty-
three out of the sample of one hundred wills were in this form as 
compared to five out of 187 American wills. 
2. Life and Remainder Interests 
In the Michigan sample, the separation of ownership from the 
beneficial enjoyment of property normally appeared in one of two 
forms: a trust administration during the lifetime of a beneficiary, 
usually the settlor's spouse, with remainders limited thereafter; or 
a trust administration during a period of years until the attainment 
of a stated age by one or more of the beneficiaries. The English wills 
studied contained only twelve arrangements of the first type, seven 
of which used the form of the trust for sale. As in Michigan, spouses 
predominated as life beneficiaries. The instruments usually directed 
the trustee to pay income to the life beneficiary, although in two 
cases the instructions were merely to hold property in trust for the 
beneficiary for life. Most wills limited remainder interests by the 
simple direction that upon the death of the life beneficiary, the 
trustees should hold in trust for the designated remaindermen. In 
four cases remainders were limited to designated classes of children 
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or issue living at the end of the life interests if they should attain 
twenty-one.79 
3. Gifts upon Attaining the Age of Twenty-One 
Under authority conferred by section 179 of the Law of Property 
Act, the English Lord Chancellor in 1925 prescribed a series of 
statutory forms which testators could incorporate in their wills by 
reference. Two of these forms contain the following language: 
[I]n trust, in equal shares if more than one, for all or any of my 
children or child who survive me and attain the age of twenty-one 
years or marry under that age, and for all or any of the issue living at 
my death who attain the age of twenty-one years or marry under that 
age of any child of mine who predeceases me, such issue to take 
through all degrees, according to their stocks, in equal shares if more 
than one, the share or shares which his or their parent would have 
taken if living at my death and so that no issues shall take whose 
parent is living at my death and so capable of taking.80 
The effect of such a form upon current drafting practice may be 
inferred from the fact that twenty-four of forty-six English trusts 
contained provisions of this sort. In most of these trusts the drafts-
man simplified the form in various respects, usually by confining 
the beneficiaries to the children of designated persons. Another 
common variation in the language limited gifts to males at twenty-
one but to females at twenty-one or marriage. In four cases the gifts 
were by way of remainder after life interests; in the rest the gifts 
were immediate but by way of substitution in the event of the lapse 
of primary gifts. Most commonly a will simply directed trustees to 
hold for a person absolutely, but if he should die during the tes-
tator's life, then in trust according to the provisions of the standard 
form. All but three wills with age limitations contained the common 
introductory clause appointing persons as both executors and trust-
ees, and all but five declared trusts for sale; only one of them made 
any other disposition which would require an active trust adminis-
tration. 81 
79. These wills employed the standard form for such dispositions discussed under 
subsection 3 below. 
80. Forms 9 &: IO. Section 47 of the Administration of Estates Act of 1925, 15 Geo. 
5, c. 23, and of the Intestates' Estates Act of 1952, 15 &: 16 Geo. 6 &: l Eliz. 2, c. 64, 
contains similar language which is applicable when the residuary estate of an intes-
tate is directed to be held on the statutory trusts for the issue of the intestate. 
81. It should be noted in passing that only one English will imposed an age contin-
gency other than the attainment of the age of twenty-one; in that case the age 
specified was twenty-five. 
Some comment may be in order upon the substance of the standard English form 
for gifts to issue. The normal distribution per stirpes to the issue of the testator living 
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We have seen that most American testators who make substitu-
tional gifts to children or issue of deceased legatees simply do not 
impose age limitations which require the use of a trust.82 If a will 
contains no other dispositions in trust, it is easy to understand why 
a testator would hesitate to declare one for so limited and contingent 
a purpose. The alternative is simply to make these substitutional 
gifts outright, without conditions relating to the age of the substi-
tuted legatees; indeed, this seems to be the prevailing American 
practice. In England, however, it is impossible to vest legal title to 
land in an infant. 83 When a gift of personal property is made to an 
infant instead of to trustees for the benefit of the infant, the testa-
tor's personal representatives are authorized by statute84 to appoint 
trustees for the infant's interest.85 
Under this and the other distinctive features of English trust law 
noted above, English testators commonly resort to the trust to sell 
and convert as an over-all or residuary umbrella, and direct trustees 
to do things which are normally done by executors in this country. 
They may rely on elaborate statutory provisions which define the 
powers and duties. of trustees, but they commonly designate rela-
tives, friends, or solicitors to serve in this capacity without compen-
sation. In this setting, English testators are relatively free to invoke 
those flexible substantive arrangements-including provisions de-
signed to protect the interests of infant beneficiaries-which consti-
tute the genius of the trust device. The prevailing practice is there-
fore to invoke a trust for all testamentary gifts to minors. 
In the United States, on the other hand, the lack of any standard 
form for common dispositive provisions is reflected in the difficulty 
at the time of his death is complicated when the testator imposes an age contingency. 
Taking by representation is confined to the situation existing at the testator's death. 
If an unmarried child dies under twenty-one after the testator's death, the number 
of primary shares are reduced and the quantum of the remaining shares is enhanced. 
No provision is made for the deceased child's issue in such an event, for unless he 
has taken a vested interest by marrying under twenty-one, the possibility of his having 
issue need not be contemplated. A number of testators, however, have abridged the 
standard form in a manner which may not be adequate to provide against all of the 
implicit contingencies. If the disposition is confined to the testator's children (rather 
than the issue) who attain twenty-one, no provision exists for the issue of a child who 
dies before the testator. If the alternative contingency of marriage under twenty-one 
is confined to female children, it is possible that a son of the testator may survive 
him, marry, and die under twenty-one leaving issue who are also not provided for. 
82. See pt. I. E. supra. 
8!1. Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 18, § 27; Law of Property Act, 1925, 
15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 19. 
84. Administration of Estates Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 2!1, § 33 (1925). 
85. Under the same statute, the intestate share of an infant passes to his personal 
representative on trust to sell and convert. 
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which many testators encounter in attempting to provide substitu-
tional gifts in the event of the death of primary beneficiaries.80 In 
light of the English experience, the publication of some sort of 
official or otherwise reliable standard but adaptable forms for this 
and other recurring dispositive problems seems desirable. Our trust 
companies seem to have made some progress in this direction, at 
least with regard to what are called administrative trust provisions. 
As for substantive provisions, we should now recognize that these 
are not necessarily as individually tailored and diverse as we have 
always believed. 
4. Simple or Inactive Trusts 
Ten of the English wills examined declared trusts in some form, 
usually trusts to sell and convert, but directed trustees to do no more 
than hold property in trust for one or more persons "absolutely."87 
The use of such a "simple" trust may appear to be no more than 
a circumlocution for making simple outright bequests or devises to 
named persons. In fact, it probably reflects the indiscriminate Eng-
lish practice of casting residuary gifts in the standard form of the 
trust to sell and convert. In any case, the practical result of a simple 
or inactive trust will normally not be different from a gift in which 
no trust terminology is employed. Still, the simple trust may be ad-
vantageous under some circumstances: if upon a testator's death the 
exigencies of the case require it, the declared trust may be allowed 
to continue if and so long as the trustees and the beneficiary both 
desire it, without further action or order of any sort, and without 
otherwise disturbing or delaying the distribution of the testator's 
estate. 
5. Professional and Personal Trustees 
We have seen that most English testators name relatives, friends, 
or solicitors to serve both as trustees and executors. In thirty-eight 
wills in which such appointments were noted, twenty-nine named 
two or more such persons; two other wills named one such person. 
In each of seven wills the testator named a bank as executor and 
trustee, and two of these wills also named personal co-executors and 
co-trustees. Wills which appointed only executors invariably named 
nonprofessionals, usually one person. 
86. See pt. I. E. supra. 
87. In several of these wills, the testator included substitutional gifts of the same 
sort. 
May 1969] Testate Succession 1353 
6. Protective Trusts 
American indulgence of the dead hand has produced not only 
the Claflin doctrine, but also our doctrine of spendthrift trusts. 
Although the latter doctrine does not exist as such in England, obvi-
ous pressure for recognizing some such restrictive device has re-
sulted in the creation of the so-called "protective trust." Under this 
arrangement, the testator directs that if any beneficiary for life does 
or suffers any act which would deprive him of the right to income, 
the trust shall terminate automatically. Thereafter, the income shall 
be held on trust to be applied for the maintenance and support of 
the beneficiary as the trustees in their absolute discretion think fit. 
In fact, section 33 of the Trustee Act of 1925 authorizes such trusts 
and prescribes a form for their use. A settlor may invoke the terms 
of the form merely by directing that income shall be held on 
"protective trusts" for the benefit of any person. Only one will in the 
present sample employed such a device for the benefit of the testa-
tor's daughter, who was life beneficiary of two thirds of the testator's 
residuary bequest. As indicated above, the incidence of spendthrift 
trusts in this country is substantially greater.88 
7. Powers of Appointment 
Only two wills in the sample conferred a power of appointment 
upon a beneficiary. In one of them the testator gave his daughter a 
life interest in two thirds of the residue of his estate with a power 
to appoint a life or lesser interest to her surviving husband followed 
by a remainder interest limited by the usual form of trust provision 
for issue at twenty-one. The other example of a power of appoint-
ment appeared in connection with a complicated devise of land 
under the Settled Land Act. 
8. Advancements or Power to Invade Corpus 
In the case of property held on trust to sell and convert, section 
32 of the Trustee Act of 1925 confers upon trustees the power in 
their absolute discretion to pay or apply capital money for the 
benefit of any person entitled to the capital of trust property. The 
trustee has this power whether the beneficiary is entitled to the capi-
tal absolutely or contingently upon attaining a certain age, or upon 
the happening of any other event. However, the trustee does not 
have the power to prejudice any person entitled to a prior life or 
88. Supra p. l!ll!l. 
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other interest unless the latter is of full age and consents in writing. 
The existence of this statutory authority explains why no such pro-
visions appeared in any of the English wills in this survey which 
disposed of property in trust for minors. It may also help to explain 
the predominance in practice of the trust to sell and convert. 
When property is limited in trust for one or more life interests 
with remainders thereafter, it may be desirable for trustees to have 
the power to invade corpus for the benefit of the life beneficiaries, 
especially when the estates involved are not large enough to assure 
their adequate maintenance out of income. It will be recalled that 
a large majority of Michigan testators who created trusts included 
such a power.89 It is surprising, therefore, to discover that among 
the dozen English wills which provided life and remainder interests, 
only one included a power to invade corpus. The terminology used 
in that will was different from that normally employed by American 
settlors. It authorized the trustees by deed and upon consent of the 
life beneficiary to revoke all or any of the trusts, powers, and provi-
siop.s declared in the legacy and to direct that the whole or any part 
thereof be held in trust for the life beneficiary absolutely. 
9. Disposition to Spouses 
The lack of public records of estate administration in England 
precludes any data on the identity of family members and other 
relatives who have survived a testator. One cannot be sure, there-
fore, whether a testator was survived by a spouse who was not men-
tioned in his will. Nor can one be sure whether a spouse mentioned 
in a will actually survived the testator. It can be inferred, however, 
that the disinheritance of spouses is rare. Although there is no 
English counterpart to the right of an American spouse to elect to 
take a statutory share against the terms of a will, an English spouse 
may seek some benefit from an estate under the so-called Family 
Provision Act90 if, upon proper application, the Chancery Division 
rules that the will did not make reasonable provision for her main-
tenance. 
The sample revealed one notable exception to the assumed prac-
tice of English testators to make adequate provision for their 
spouses: one testator established three elaborate trusts of both real 
and personal property but merely named his wife as one of several 
executors and trustees. It can be inferred from the surrounding 
89. Supra p. ISSI. 
90. 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 45 (1938), as amended, Intestates' Estates Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 
& 1 Eliz. 2, c. 64, pt. II (1952). 
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circumstances that the wife had been amply provided for, either 
from her own resources or by prior inter vivos settlements. This case 
may indicate an advantage which the English system of flexible 
restraints on testation based upon the actual needs of surviving 
spouses has over the invariable forced share typically found in the 
United States, at least when the forced share statute does not take 
account of resources available to a surviving spouse other than those 
passing by will. 
Data derived from the wills themselves may give some idea 
about the place of spouses generally in the English patterns of 
succession. Out of the sample of one hundred wills, thirty-nine 
named spouses as beneficiaries. The most significant fact-particu-
larly in the light of similar data in this country91-is that twenty-five 
of the thirty-nine wills named spouses as the sole beneficiary. Seven 
more wills appeared to give the bulk of the estate to spouses, subject 
only to limited specific or general bequests. In seven other wills, 
spouses received less predominant portions. Of the wills not includ-
ing spouses, thirty-three included children or other issue; twenty-
eight mentioned a variety of relatives and nonrelatives other than 
spouses or issue. 
10. Settlements under the Settled Land Act: One Relic? 
In only one English case was land disposed of under the com-
plicated provisions of the Settled Land Act. In that case, the testa-
tor devised certain family land in trust with an elaborate succession 
of beneficial interests for life and in tail, including successive special 
powers of appointment in two beneficiaries.92 When such an elabo-
91. Supra pp. 1307-08. 
92. The language of the will was as follows: 
I give and devise my freehold property situated and being in the County of 
••• and known as .•. to my Trustees ••• upon the following trusts and so that 
every interest for life shall be without impeachment for waste: 
(a) Upon trust for my son •.• (A) ••• during his life with remainder 
(b) Upon trust for the first and other sons successively in order of seniority 
of my Son ••• [AJ in tail with remainder Upon Trust for such daughter of my 
Son ••• [AJ as he shall by Deed or Will appoint with remainder 
(c) Upon trust for the first and other Daughters successively in order of senior-
ity of my Son ••• fAJ in tail with remainder 
(d) Upon trust for my Daughter ••• [BJ during her life with remainder Upon 
trust for such Son of my Daughter .•• [BJ as she shall by Deed or Will appoint 
with remainder 
(e) Upon trust for the first and other Sons successively in order of seniority 
of my Daughter ••. [B] in tail with remainder Upon trust for such Daughter of 
my Daughter ••. fB] as she shall by Deed or Will appoint with remainder 
(f) Upon trust lor the first and other daughters successively in order of senior-
ity of my Daughter ••• [B] with remainder 
(g) Upon trust for such descendant of ••• [C] as the survivor of my Son ••• 
[AJ and my Daughter ••• [BJ shall by Will or Codicil appoint and in default of 
and subject to any such appomtment In trust for the National Trust for Places of 
Historic Interest or Natural Beauty •..• 
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rate disposition emerges under an ingenious statutory scheme which 
-though complicated itself-facilitates a simple and straight-for-
ward system of transmitting family wealth, one wonders if it signifies 
anything more than an aristocratic nostalgia for the era of the strict 
settlement.93 But the care with which this disposition was drafted 
suggests a more thoughtful purpose. On its face it suggests an at-
tempt by the testator to direct the devolution of a landed estate for 
a very long time indeed. By resort to entailed interests with re-
mainders which must vest in due time, the testator has kept his 
disposition within the limits of the Rule Against Perpetuities. But 
the land itself has not been tied up at all, for each of the successive 
"tenants for life" can convey the land in fee simple, preserving only 
a capital fund in its place. The ability to break out of the strictures 
of the disposition has been further enlarged by the power in two 
of the beneficiaries to appoint the corpus absolutely. If this testator 
had merely wanted to preserve the corpus in one form or another 
for as long as possible, he could have accomplished his purpose 
much more simply, as some eccentric English testators have shown 
by their resort to the notorious "royal-lives clause."94 Presumably 
this testator really did want to keep the family land intact as long 
as possible. By his antiquated scheme of dispositions, he announced 
his purpose. Although the English law no longer allows him to 
enforce this purpose, he has at least established an intricate line 
of succession which will operate without further ado unless one 
or another of the participants along the way chooses to sever the 
bonds of successive entailments. It may be assumed that there are 
moral pressures here against any severance that it not made for 
compelling reasons. Maybe this is all that the complicated regimes 
still permitted by the Settled Land Act amount to: the formal 
marshalling of moral pressure for perpetuating landed estates sub-
ject to the overriding policy of modern English law that land shall 
always remain freely alienable. 
C. Summary Impressions 
For usual testamentary purposes, the English legal profession 
has exhibited a continued sensitivity to the initial genius of the trust. 
In characteristic fashion, it has achieved by a complexity of appara-
tus an admirable simplicity of practice. In so doing, the legal pro-
93. A. CASNER 8e w. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 382 (1st. std. ed. 1950). 
94. See, e.g., In re Villar, [1929] 1 Ch. 243. 
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fession has rendered the trust a normal and routine, rather than an 
extraordinary, dispositive device. By somehow promoting a practice 
of such generality that a trust is at times declared when no special 
reasons for a trust appear, the English have remained free of those 
impediments which frequently turn settlers away when good reasons 
for a trust are present. And they may have escaped the reproach, so 
often uttered among us, that the trust is a device of value only to the 
wealthy. At the same time, when the complexity of large estates 
creates the need or desire for more elaborate arrangements, all of 
the devices and practices familiar to us-as well as some uniquely 
complex arrangements of their own-may be employed. 
III. CAVEAT AND CONCLUSION 
This Article must end, not with a flair of trumpets, but on 
a quiet note. The study was begun, not to prove a thesis, but to 
look at a massive institution across a narrow spectrum and report 
the results. What I have seen does not seem to be alarming, nor 
unresponsive to the current needs of those who should be served 
by the available processes of te~tamentary succession. Looking back 
at the local sample of American experience through some of the 
more striking contrasts with the English scene, one cannot justify 
any general or ultimate comparative judgment. On the basis of what 
appears herein, one cannot even say whether the English system is 
better for them than ours is for us. The English seem to me to do 
their job in this field very efficiently. But we cannot expect to dupli-
cate fully the results of their experience. Having long since departed 
from our common origins, we have for compelling reasons experi-
enced a somewhat divergent legal history. 
When we speak of comparative law, we rarely think of English-
American comparisons; we tend to assume too much about a com-
mon heritage. This is unfortunate, for there may be special signif-
icance in the differences between kindred forces. To the extent 
that this study was comparative, however, I am more aware of sub-
stantial similarities than of meaningful contrasts. The simple dis-
positions of humble people are much the same on both sides of the 
Atlantic, and are carried out in much the same way, despite the 
widespread use in England of the "trust for sale." 
I have made some comments throughout this Article about 
specific American and English laws and practices. At this point, a 
few more general observations are in order. 
First, the study has revealed that a feature of relative strength 
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in English practice is its responsiveness to the needs of common 
people. In this regard, the greatest source of American disadvantage 
lies in our complicated system of estate administration. The monu-
mental efforts of the current committee charged with producing a 
new Uniform Probate Code may substantially reduce this disad-
vantage. I refer mainly to the efforts of the committee to establish 
a system of informal, judicially unsupervised administration of 
decedents' estates--a system which would avoid unnecessary delays 
and expense. This must be the most effective answer to the clamor 
about "how to avoid probate." The same objective logically extends 
to trust administration, so that testamentary trusts can be admin-
istered with the same simplicity as inter vivos trusts. The commitee 
is also projecting appropriate legislation in this direction. 
Second, we would do well to reconsider the policy behind the 
Claflin doctrine,95 as well as our elaborate doctrine on spendthrift 
trusts. I must admire the English attitude toward the dead-hand con-
trol of property. There is something appealing about their recogni-
tion that normally the continuance of a trust need not be compelled 
beyond the minority of a beneficiary or the duration of a life in-
terest. English trustees are answerable in court only to those who are 
beneficially interested in or entitled to the trust estate. The ghost 
of a deceased settlor who has parted with all interest in property 
sits with little grace upon a trustee who is by such visitation au-
thorized to resist the requests of those who are the beneficial owners. 
Abolition of the Claflin doctrine would not necessarily require the 
abolition of spendthrift trusts. But such trusts could be confined 
within reasonable limits, and testators need not be encouraged to 
use them. There are some signs of a trend in this direction. Recently 
the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of spendthrift trusts 
altogether.96 
To achieve some of the incidental benefits which ought to follow 
from the removal of the Claflin doctrine would require a more sen-
sible treatment of so-called dry or passive trusts. If property is simply 
given in trust for one or more persons in succession-without ex-
press directions to the trustee about the payment of income and 
principal-it is fair to assume that the trustee is expected to do 
what a trustee is required by law to do in the management of prop-
erty for the benefit of others. This includes the payment of income 
to any beneficiary who is not yet entitled to call for the payment of 
principal. If the latter duty is not clear in our law unless expressly 
95. See text accompanying notes 52 and 69 supra. 
96. Sherrow v. Brookover, 174 Ohio St. 90, 189 N.E.2d 90 (196!1). 
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directed, it can easily be made explicit by an appropriate provision 
in any trust code. 
English as well as American testators rely upon elaborate trust 
provisions whenever they have elaborate dispositive objectives. As 
we have seen, English testators resort to the standard form of the 
trust for sale as a normal and common means of testamentary dispo-
sition. It is striking that in the land of the strict settlement, trusts 
are routinely expressed in the simplest conceivable terms. Perhaps 
the contrast between the two systems can be put most simply by 
saying that English testators commonly resort to simple trusts in 
circumstances in which American testators would not resort to the 
trust at all. 
We would hardly wish to encourage American testators to em-
ploy the trust if they would prefer to leave their property outright. 
But if we had the English doctrinal structure, testators could more 
readily resort to the trust when its special benefits are indicated. I 
have been struck by the common English practice of making dispo-
sitions in such forms as the following: (a) "to X in trust for my 
daughter B absolutely," or (b) "in trust for my wife for life, and 
on her death in trust for my children A and Bin equal shares." The 
American counterpart of (a) would probably take the form of an 
outright gift to B. Under (b), a testator might give property to his 
wife for life, with a remainder on her death to A and B; alterna-
tively, he might give the property in trust, to pay the income to 
his wife for life, and on her death to pay the principal to A and B. 
Although the differences may seem to be insignificant, the English 
practice under (a) has the advantage of permitting continuance of 
the trust if the parties desire it under the circumstances existing 
when the decedent's estate is closed. There would be no need to 
worry about the duties of the trustee, for income would be paid to 
B until she attained her majority and called for payment of the 
principal. Nor would there be any concern about what should hap-
pen on B's death, for since she would be the owner of the beneficial 
interest, she could leave it to whomever she pleased. 
Consider in contrast how an American testator would proceed 
if he wanted to give a full beneficial title to B but also wished to pro-
vide the benefits of a trust administration for B's benefit. The drafts-
man would insist that the testator prescribe the trust duration, which 
under the circumstances might be arbitrary and wholly unrelated 
to B's future needs. Moreover, he would have to tell the trustee 
what to do after trust termination. If the duration of the trust were 
for B's life, it would be difficult to express this in terms of a direction 
1360 Michigan Law Review 
to pay principal without implying that it was the testator, rather 
than B, who was controlling the devolution of title upon B's death. 
In such circumstances a draftsman may feel driven to prescribe an 
elaborate skein of contingent future interests, which might not only 
depart from the original purpose of the disposition but might also 
present those pitfalls of ambiguity which lurk in the path of an un-
wary or inexperienced draftsman. Much the same analysis can be 
made for example (b), except for the interposition of the life 
estate which under the English rules would prevent termination of 
the trust in the meantime unless all parties, sui juris, otherwise 
agreed. In summary, for those testators who do not wish to leave 
all their property outright, there may be some sense in promoting 
a trust system which encourages making as many beneficial interests 
as possible indefeasibly vested, rather than trust practices, like ours, 
which commonly produce a variety of contingent future interests. 
Third, the survey indicates that English practice virtually elimi-
nates outright testamentary dispositions to minors-undoubtedly a 
consequence of the doctrine which prevents the legal title to land 
from ever vesting in a minor. Resort to the trust for sale as a normal 
and common means of testamentary disposition permits an efficient 
and flexible means of transmitting property to minors, one that 
includes some assurance that their interests will be properly pro-
tected. Under provisions of the English trust statutes, a trustee 
under a trust for sale, unless othenvise directed by the settlor, has 
several alternatives in disposing of income and principal for a 
minor's benefit, including a discretion to pay income to a parent 
or guardian. Within the framework of the changes suggested above, 
we could improve our management of the interests of infant bene-
ficiaries. 
Fourth, the prevalence in England of standard patterns of disposi-
tion reflects the absence or suppression of individual disposititve 
whims as :well as a distillation of drafting experience. Standard sub-
stantive provisions for recurrent dispositive situations are com-
monly kept by American law firms, estate specialists, and trust 
companies, but the best of these forms are too often husbanded as 
part of an undisclosed stock-in-trade. Some such material should be 
made available to the casual draftsman-the one most likely to serve 
persons of modest means. Legislation could authorize standard 
provisions to be incorporated by reference; at least such provisions 
could serve as models for individual adaptation. The more general 
the circulation and use of such provisions, the more readily could 
testators be led to formulate their objectives accordingly. 
